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UNIONS AS JURIDICAL PERSONS
Sir R. Reid [interrupting] : The trade unions are not corporations.
Prime Minister Balfour: I know; I am talking English, not law.
(House of Commons, 1904)1
IN industry, society and speech, unions are today regarded as entities no
less "corporate" in character than business corporations. 2 Notwithstanding
basic differences in function and purpose, 3 both unions and corporations
typically act as institutional units distinct from their members or stockholders.
4
Each enters as an entity into collective bargaining relationships with the
other and into diverse economic relationships with third parties and its own
members.' Though seldom formally incorporated, 6 a union is thus aptly
1. Quoted in MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in S-LECTEII
ESSAYS 224 n.1 (1936).
2. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385 (1922):
.. in every way the union acts as a business entity, distinct from its members. No
organized corporation has greater unity of action .... "; Witmer, Trade Union Liability.
The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40-41, 63 (1941) : "[W)e
have created an unincorporated corporation." See also ROBERTS, TRADE UNION GovErN-
MENT AND ADAINIsTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 3, 467 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
ROBERTS).
3. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 697 (1944) ; Dodd, Some State Legis-
latures Go to War-on Labor Unions, 29 IowA L. REV. 143, 172-73 (1944). Compare state-
ment of former CIO General Counsel: "Labor unions cannot be truthfully equated with
corporations; their structures, their purposes, their method of operation are entirely differ-
ent," with statement of General Counsel of United States Chamber of Commerce: "In many
instances [unions] have become far more powerful than the employers with whom they
do business. Today most observers would agree . . . 'the strongest unions . . . . are
the most powerful economic organizations which the country has ever seen.' " Goldberg,
AFL-CIO, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MLEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIoNs
RESEARCH Ass'N 45, 46 (1956) ; Barton, M11ajor Trends in American Trade Union De-
velopment, 1933-55, in id. 38, 39.
4. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701-02 (1944); Superior Engraving
Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951).
The text statement is not affected by the fact that in many instances members have
greater control over union officials than stockholders over corporate management. Compare
TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS (1954) and ROBERTS (con-
siderable degree of control by union members), with BERLE & M1EANS, THE MIODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (stockholder of large corporation virtually
powerless). But cf. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DE iocRAcy (1956) (optimistic view of
possibilities for shareholder control).
5. See, e.g., Witmer, supra note 2; text at notes 162-71 infra.
6. 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 179 (Supp. 1950) (here-
inafter cited as TELLER). A statute permitting federal incorporation of unions was enacted
in 1886. Act of June 29, 1886, c. 567, 24 STAT. 86. Although introduced at the request
of organized labor, 17 CoNG. REc. 1900, 5565-66 (1886), it was repealed in 1932, Act
of July 22, 1932, c. 524, 47 STAT. 741, because no bona fide union had ever incorporated
under it. Some fraudulent insurance companies, calling themselves unions, had done so
to avoid state regulation. S. REP,. No. 861, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) ; H. REP. No. 1763,
UNIONS AS JURIDICAL PERSONS
called a "natural corporation."7 In law, however, the union's status has re-
mained that of an unincorporated voluntary association like a social club or a
church., Despite its functional status as a corporate body, the union is not a
"juridical person" or "legal entity" :9 a distinct right-and-duty bearing unit in
the eyes of the law, like a natural person or corporation. The law regards a
labor organization as an aggregate of individuals. 10 The rights and duties
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); 75 CoNG. REc. 13997 (1932). Federal incorporation was
again proposed in more recent Congresses. See Association of Westinghouse Employees
v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955).
Unions may incorporate under existing statutes in many states. See, e.g., N.Y.
M eimsnr, CoRP. LAW; Hagan v. Picard, 171 Misc. 475, 12 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 258 App. Div. 771, 14 N.Y.S.2d 706 (3d Dep't 1939). But compulsory state in-
corporation of unions has been held unconstitutional as a denial of freedom of speech,
press and assembly. AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 95-96, 98-99, 155 P.2d 145, 147-49
(1944), 58 HAuv. L. REv. 1256 (1945).
British trade unions may not incorporate under the Companies Act. Trade Union
Act of 1871, § 5, 34 & 35 Vicr., c. 31.
The reluctance of trade unions to incorporate has been shared by voluntary asso-
ciations in general. See MAITLAND, Trust and Corporatiol, in SELECTED EsSAYS 141,
205-07 (1936).
7. DicEy, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 154 (1914). See also MAITLAND,
Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in SELEcTED EssAys 223-25 (1936) ; Maitland's
Introduction to GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1900) ; Laski, The
Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404 (1916). But cf. Laski, Morris Cohen's
Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. CH. L. REv. 575 (1948); Duguit, Collective Acts
as Distinguished from Contracts, 27 YALE LJ. 753 (1918).
8. See, generally, LLOYD, UNINCORPORATED AssociATIoNs (1938). The law govern-
ing internal affairs of unions is more assimilated to that of unincorporated associations
than is the law concerning their external relationships. See 1 TELLER 291 (1940);
LANDIS, CAsEs ON LABOR LAW vii-viii (1934) ; RoBEaTs 34.
For a summary of union legal status in each American jurisdiction, see Forkosch,
The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEmP. L.Q. 1 (1954).
For a criticism of the dichotomy between unions' legal and functional status see A Blow
for Freedom, The Times (London), Nov. 8, 1955, p. 9, col. 2. See also 218 LAW Tm zs
171, 172 (1954); Frankfurter, The Coronado Case, 31 NEW REPUBLIC 328, 330 (1922).
But cf. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 136 (1955) (that union is entity
in fact and common parlance is no ground to hold it entity in law).
9. Terms such as "juridical person," "juristic person," "legal entity," "legal person,"
"legal unit," are often used interchangeably. See WA.RRN, CoRPoRATE ADvANTAGES
WITHOUT INCORPORATION 14-15 (1929) (hereinafter cited as WARREN) ; cf. Bonsor v.
Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 107, 155 (1.955). To avoid confusion, "juridical per-
son" will be employed consistently herein. For a definition, see id. at 134. The term
will be applied to unions in the same sense as in the statement "corporations are juridical
persons," being synonymous with the use of "legal unit" by WARREN. The status or at-
tributes characteristic of "juridical persons" will be referred to as "juridical personality."
See also note 50 infra.
10. See, e.g., Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); EX parte
Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 851 (1929). To the law
unions are "bodies unincorporate, bodies-the thought is charmingly English-which are
bodiless." Laski, Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 407 (1916). See also
Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N.C. 505, 507, 120 S.E. 57, 59 (1923) (union like an "airy
nothing").
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ordinarily called "the union's" are in law those of its members."- At common
law, consequently, unions cannot sue or be sued without joining every mem-
ber in the action.12 But like corporations, unions may acquire the procedural
standing and substantive rights and duties of juridical persons through legis-
lation.1
3
A developing recognition of the need to make unincorporated associations
such as unions legally responsible led most jurisdictions to impose on them
by statute various characteristics of juridical persons, particularly that of
suability. 14 As a practical matter, maintaining the common law rule would
have prevented suit by or against these groups of increasing size and growing
economic importance. 15 For the most part, however, statutes affecting the
status of unions dealt generally with unincorporated associations rather than
with unions and their peculiar problems.' 6 In no American jurisdiction, more-
over, are unions recognized as juridical persons for all purposes. 17 Thus, unions
11. Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 59-61 (1922). Similarly, partners' legal rights and duties
are called "the partnership's". See also WARREN 1-13.
12. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385-86 (1922); 2
TELLER §§ 462, 467 (1940 & Supps. 1947, 1950) ; Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suabil-
ity of Labor Organizations, 28 Tz-,iP. L.Q. 1, 2-5 (1954). However, the common law
rule was often mitigated by such doctrines as waiver and estoppel. See sources cited
above. See also Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YM
L.J. 383 (1924) ; Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REv.
977 (1929).
In equity the class suit device avoids the common law requirement for joinder of all
members. United line Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., supra at 387; 2 TELLER § 462
(Supp. 1950).
13. See Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 429.
14. See note 16 infra.
Suability, though sometimes mistakenly equated with juridical personality, is but
one of its characteristics. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) ; Sperry
Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943). See Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor
Organizations, 28 TEmp. L.Q. 1 (1954).
15. "To remand persons injured to a suit against each of the 400,000 members . ..
would be to leave them remediless." United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344, 389 (1922).
Union membership in the United States is approximately 18 million. See U.S. BuREAu
OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, DRE'T OF LABOR, Bull. No. 1185, DIREcrORy or NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1955, at 6-11. In the United
Kingdom it is about 9/ million. ROBERTS app. 1. See also Barton, supra note 3, at 38-41
(growth in union economic power and financial resources) ; Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 369
n.1 (1956) (other associations) ; cf. Friedmann, Corporate Power, Governinzct by Private
Groups, and the Law, 57 CoLum. L. Ray. 155 (1957).
16. The statutes are discussed in Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor
Organizations, 28 Tszp. L.Q. 1 (1954). See also 2 TELLER §§ 465-66 (Supp. 1950);
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,.lst Sess. 15-18 (1947).
17. Forkosch, The Legal Statuts and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEMP.
L.Q. 1 (1954). Even where for procedural purposes of suit an association is treated like
a juridical person, it may be dealt with as an aggregate in other questions of adjective
law, e.g., venue. Compare Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads,
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are treated differently from corporations in three major respects. Many pro-
cedural pitfalls still arise in suits involving unions, so that actions often fail
on procedural grounds or are not brought at all.' 8 Secondly, even when pro-
cedural obstacles are overcome, the union may not be regarded as an entity
in resolving the substantive issues presented. The "New York rule," for ex-
ample, requires a showing that each member authorized or ratified an officer's
act in order to bind the union; yet a corporation is bound by its agents acting
within the scope of their employment. 19 Finally, access to the federal courts
on diversity grounds is available in cases involving unions only in the rare in-
stance where every member is of diverse citizenship from the opposing party.2 0
But corporations can readily qualify for diversity jurisdiction since they are
deemed citizens of the state of incorporation. 21
These significant inadequacies can be remedied by full acceptance of unions
as juridical persons. This Comment will first examine the basis in case and
statute law for recognizing this status. It will then discuss the procedural,
substantive, and diversity-jurisdiction consequences of such recognition, and
the policy considerations they raise.22
THE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY BASIS FOR JURIDICAL PERSONALITY
American case law on union legal status has been closely related to English
case law 2 3 and both have depended heavily on questions of statutory interpre-
tation. The early twentieth century House of Lords Taff Vale decision 24
provided the first important judicial impetus toward according unions status
as legal persons.2 5 In 1922 the Supreme Court incorporated Taff Vale into
132 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943), with Juneau Spruce
Corp. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 37 Cal. 2d 760, 235 P.2d 607 (1951). See
Annot., 145 A.L.R. 700 (1943); Comment, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 444, 446 (1945).
18. See text at notes 143-61 infra.
19. See text at notes 162-71 infra.
20. Class suits sometimes present an exception. See note 186 infra.
21. See text at notes 172-214 infra.
22. The suggestion to eliminate legal distinctions between incorporated and unin-
corporated bodies in general, see STEVENs, CORPORATIONS § 8 (2d ed. 1949), -will not be
considered. Whatever the merits of this proposal, different and stronger legal and policy
arguments relate to union status in particular. Even the classic attack against attributing
juridical personality to unincorporated associations conceded that unions were the likeliest
exception to this view. See WARREN 13.
23. Cf. Shulman, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1431 (1949).
On the legal status of British trade unions, see, generally, CITRINE, TADE UNION LAw
(1950); ROBERTs cc. I, II.
24. Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426.
25. See MARTIN, HAROLD LAsiu 67 n. (1953); Maitland, The Unincorporated Body,
in SELECTED EssAYs 128 (1936). The decision was largely responsible for the emerg-
ence of the British Labor Party. ATTL.z, THE LAotm PARTY IN PERSPECTVE AND TWELVE
YEARS LATER 45 (1949). The Party's political success secured passage of the Trade
Disputes Act of 1906, 6 Ew. 7, c. 47, which barred the courts from entertaining tort suits
against unions and so removed the practical effect of Taff Vale. See 2 BEER, A HISTORY
1957]
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American federal law in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,26 and
on the basis of Coronado later promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(b) governing suability of unincorporated associations. 27 In the United
States, moreover, subsequent statutory developments, notably the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley laws, 28 indicated legislative treatment of unions as legal units.
In 1955 judicial recognition of union entity status achieved its furthest ex-
tension in the House of Lords' decision in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union,29 which
reappraised the meaning of Taff Vale. Coming at a time when unionism is
far better established than when Taff Vale and Coronado were decided,30
the reasoning of Bonsor calls for a similar reappraisal in American law.31 While
none of this trio of decisions provides unambiguous authority on the legal
status of unions, together with the American statutes they afford strong
grounds for declaring unions juridical persons.
oF BRMTISH SociALism 324-26 (1921). But the act left unimpaired the legal basis of the
decision and its effect on juridical personality. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C.
104,125,139,154 (1955).
26. 259 U.S. 344, 390-91 (1922). See text at note 65 infra.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) reads:
". ... In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law of the state in which the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership
or other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law of
such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing
for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. .. ."
See Advisory Committee Note on Rule 17(b), 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 1303 (1948)
(hereinafter cited as MooRE).
28. Wagner (National Labor Relations Act), 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1952) ; Taft-Hartley (Labor Management Relations Act), 61 STAT.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1952).
29. [1956] A.C. 104 (1955), reversing [1954] Ch. 479 (C.A.).
30. See note 15 supra. Union membership has increased roughly fivefold in the United
States since Coronado and in Britain since Taff Vale. Probably even greater has been
the increase in the power, resources and community acceptance of the respective labor
movements. See RoBERTs 1; Saposs, Rebirth of the American Labor Movement, in PRO-
CEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16, 29.
Whatever the differences in motive behind them, Bonsor and the Taft-Hartley Act
represent parallel developments in response to increased union strength; both recogniz
the need for legal safeguards of members' rights as well as changes in union legal status.
See Taft-Hartley Act § 1 (b) ; ROBERTS 35-36; Forkosch, Internal Affairs of Unions, 18
U. CaI. L REv. 729 (1951). Thus, an aggrieved member achieved essentially the same
redress as in Bonsor by a Taft-Hartley unfair labor practice charge in Radio Officers
Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). See note 165 infra.
31. On the need for a similar reappraisal of Canadian law on union status, see Trade
Union Statits in Canada, 6 Crr 's L.J. 18 (1956). Since American "international"
unions operate in Canada, uniformity of legal status in both countries is clearly desirable.
It would avoid the anomalous situation in which an American union was held a legal
entity when operating in Canada though not one at home. Vancouver Mach. Depot, Ltd.
v. United Steelworkers, [1948] 2 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 325, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 518
(B.C.C.A.).
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Case Law: Bonsor, Taff Vale and Coronado
In Bonsor a precedent that threatened to deny damages to a wrongfully ex-
pelled member of a union compelled the House of Lords' extensive considera-
tion of a union's legal status.3 2 The trial court, affirmed by the Court of
Appeal,33 declared that Bonsor's expulsion from his closed shop union was
void as contrary to the union's rules. Interpreting the rules as a membership
contract which impliedly provided that no member could be expelled other-
wise than as stated, the court enjoined interference with his membership. But
bound by a factually indistinguishable Court of Appeal precedent of 1915,
Kelly's case,34 the court denied contract damages for lost wages.35 In Kelly
the court had viewed a union as an aggregate of individuals, and therefore
considered the membership contract an agreement of the members inter se.
The union officials who wrongfully expelled plaintiff were deemed agents
of every member including the plaintiff; thus the member could not recover
for acts of his own agent.
36
32. One commentator predicted that although legal theorists would discuss Bonsor
for years to come, the decision's practical impact on English unions would be slight be-
cause wrongful expulsions are uncommon. Note, 72 L.Q. Rv. 3 (1956). But cases and
other commentaries indicate the contrary. See National Amalgamated Stevedores Union
v. Spring, Manchester Guardian, March 15, 1956, p. 5, cols. 1-2 (Liverpool Ch. Ct.);
Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1954] Ch. 479, 506 (C.A.); Ex parte Malone, [1921.] 2 K.B.
694, 709; Thomas, Trade Unions and their Members, [1956] CAmB. L.J. 67; Grunfeld,
Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, Socialist Commentary, Feb. 1956, p. 20.
33. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1954] Ch. 479 (C.A.). The dissenting opinion
contains the legal arguments accepted by the House of Lords and also a consideration
of the policy questions which the House never discussed. The Court of Appeal considered
the issue of such importance that it took the unusual step of recommending an appeal
to the House of Lords. Id. at 506.
On the law of wrongful expulsion prior to the House of Lords decision, see Thomas,
Expulsion from Trade Unions, in THR LAW iN AcTioN 45 (1954); CITRiNE, TRADE
UxioN LAW 211-25 (1950). On American law, see notes 165-66 infra.
34. Kelly v. National Soc'y of Operative Printers' Assistants, 84 LJ.K.B. 2236,
31 T.L.R. 632 (1915). Although counsel in Bonsor sought to distinguish Kelly, see [1956]
A.C. at 108, none of the House of Lords found it distinguishable. Id. at 121, 128, 146-47,
153, 156.
There was a Court of Appeal precedent apparently contrary to Kelly, National Union
of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [1946] K.B. 81 (C.A.), holding that a
union suing for libel was a juridical person. But the Court of Appeal reconciled the
cases by holding that a union's legal status was different vis-a-vis third parties than
members. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1954] Ch. 479, 504 (C.A.). More plausible is the
suggestion that the Court in Gillian ruled contrary to Kelly because the latter, not having
been officially reported, was overlooked. Goodhart, The Legal Personality of a Trade
Union, 70 L.Q. ray. 322 (1954). In Bonsor neither Court of Appeal nor House of Lords
nor reported arguments of counsel cited Willis and London Soc'y of Compositors v.
B~rooks, 62 T.L.R. 745, 746, [1947] 1 All E.R. 191, 192 (K.B. 1946), which in a dictum
extended Gillian to authorize a member's suit against his union.
35. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 105-06 (1955) (summarizing the
trial court's opinion).
36. Id. at 121, 131, 147, 153, 157.
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The House of Lords unanimously reversed the denial of damages to Bonsor
but differed sharply on the question of juridicial personality.37 Two of the
five Lords considered the union a juridical person, the membership contract
being between it and each member. The agent breaching the contract had
acted for the juridical person, not for any member, and the union was vicari-
ously liable.38 Two other Lords approved Kelly's concept of the union as an
aggregate of individuals, but overruled the holding that an agent could act
on behalf of the very person injured.39 Although the union official was thus
the agent of all other members and conceptually each must have been liable,40
no procedural device existed for executing judgment on any but common
property because the suit was brought against the union in its registered
name.41 This view would seem to call for allegation and proof of the liability
of each present union member, an impracticable requirement in view of the
change in membership since Bonsor's expulsion.4 These Lords, however,
circumvented this logical obstacle by declaring that the "procedural conse-
quences" of Taff Vale made the showing of individual liability unnecessary.
43
The fifth Lord adopted an intermediate position which, although somewhat
ambivalent, seems to rest on a juridical person concept of unions.44 For him,
unions resemble other unincorporated associations in not being conceptually
distinct from their members at any instant, but they differ in the vital respect
that "it is unnecessary to consider who were the members at any particular
time." The union assumes "a collective responsibility for all members past,
present and future, in respect of any cause of action for which it may be made
liable. . . -45 Apparently, the member qua member cannot be individually
liable.46 Rather, the union as an entity is a right-and-duty bearing unit: the
37. The case was remanded for assessment of damages. Following Bonsor, substantial
damages were recovered by a wrongfully expelled member in Harkness v. Electrical Trades
Union, Manchester Guardian, June 30, 1956, p. 4 (High Ct.).
38. [1956J A.C. at 120-32.
39. Id. at 132-49, 155-58.
40. See id. at 148-49, 157.
41. Id. at 145-46, 157. Had the union been unregistered, it could not have been sued
in its common name. CITRINE, TRAD UNION LAW 145 (1950) ; see note 52 infra. The
decision in Bonsor was limited to registered unions.
42. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 118, 127 (1955). See also id. at
144-45.
43. Id. at 144-46, 155. The "procedural" interpretation is inconsistent with the con-
cession that the union must be shown liable "as an organized combination." Id. at 145.
See text at notes 137-47 infra; Lloyd, Damages for Wrongful Expulsion from a Trade
Union: Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, 19 MoDERN L. REv. 121, 129 (1956). Moreover,
Parliament's failure to provide for execution against union members would seem to imply
that the legislature did regard the union as a juridical person. See also note 55 infra.
44. Since there is no "opinion of the court" in a House of Lords decision, commen-
tators have disputed which position the majority did endorse. Compare Lloyd, supra note
43, and Field-Fisher, Trade Unions-No Longer Privileged?, 106 L.J. (n.s.) 454 (1956)
with Thomas, Trade Unions and Their Members, [1956] CAIB. L.J. 67, and Notes, 72
L.Q. REv. 3, 2 SYDNEY L. REv. 185 (1956).
45. [1956] A.C. at 149-50 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
46. Id. at 149-50, 153.
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official's act of expelling Bonsor bound neither Bonsor nor any other member,
but only the unit. 47 Irreconcilable with the aggregate theory, this position
follows readily if unions are viewed as juridical persons.48 Even the concept that
unions are not distinct from their members accords with one of the familiar
theories of the nature of corporations. 49
Despite their differing conclusions, the Lords all agreed that union status
and juridical personality depended on the degree to which statutory provisions,
explicit and implicit, had changed the common law.50 The statute on which
the Bonsor rationale was based, the British Trade Union Act of 1871,51 had
removed the common law disabilities of unions and conferred minor privileges
and responsibilities on those registering pursuant to the act.5 2 Taff Vale in
47. Id. at 153-54. The agent's act was equated with expulsion by a majority vote
of the members. Just as "the union is bound by the voice of the majority," it is bound
by the voice of union officials, though in both cases members individually are not bound
by another's act. But cf. note 40 supra and accompanying text.
48. A comparison with the same Lord's opinion in the Scottish case of Mair v. Wood,
[1948] Sess. Cas. 83, 88-93, supports the text position. There he was dealing with a
partnership, which under Scots law is a juridical person. He regarded it, like the union
in Bonsor, as formed by a membership contract inter se and as indistinguishable from
its members at any given time. Moreover in his view the union, unlike the Scots partner-
ship, is capable of sustaining vicarious liability to a member, and the members' liability
is limited to their contributions to the common treasury. Thus the union resembles a
corporation more closely than the partnership-juridical person. See also note 49 infra.
This view is almost identical with the Supreme Court's in United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 701 (1944), that a union represents only the "common" not the "personal"
interests of its members. See note 70 infra.
49. Cf. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 17, 46, 202 (1936) ; 1 MoRAwErz, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 1 (2d ed. 1886); McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARV. L. REV. 853, 869
(1943); Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 307, 316;
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793).
If the union is a juridical person the only important difference resulting from con-
sidering the membership contract one inter se is that certain of its provisions may be made
unenforceable by the restrictions on jurisdiction over "agreement[s] between members"
in § 4(1) of the British Trade Union Act. See Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C.
104, 154 (1955); Amalgamated Soc'y of Carpenters v. Braithwaite, [1922] 2 A.C. 440;
Thomas, Expulsion from Trade Unions, in THE LAW IN AcioN 45, 52 (1954) ; Responsi-
bilities of Trade Unions, [1956] ScoTs L.T. 25, 30. But such unenforceability would not
affect the union's status as a juridical person. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, supra at 123;
Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 429, 431.
50. The conceptual basis of corporate personality was not discussed. The subject is
one with which the Common Law has neither been particularly concerned nor consistent.
See DuFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 206-21 (1938) ; LLOYD, UNINcORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS 1-17 (1938) ; FRIEDMANN, J EGAL THEORY c. 25 (3d ed. 1953) ; Maitland,
Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS 141. (1936).
Likewise, the proposals of this Comment do not depend on acceptance of any particular
theory of the nature of corporate personality.
51. 34 & 35 Vlcr. c. 31--called the unions' "charter of legal existence," Yorkshire
Miners' Ass'n v. Howden, [1905] A.C. 256, 275, and "charter of incorporation," Amalga-
mated Soc'y of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, [1910] A.C. 87, 92 (1909). See CITRINE, TRADE
UNION LAW pt. II (1950) (detailed consideration of statute).
52. E.g., unions were made exempt from common law rules on restraint of trade;
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1901 had held the act also necessarily implied, since no express provision to
the contrary appeared, that the union-like a corporation-could be sued in
its registered name and made liable to the extent of its funds for its agents'
acts. 3 In Bonsor the Lords disagreed on whether Taff Vale's interpretation
of the statute decreed juridical personality for unions or only certain attributes
of that status plus "procedural consequences" leading to the same result but on
the theory that the members were being sued in a kind of representative
action.54 The former interpretation of Taff Vale, it is maintained, is correct r
registered unions were given express power to hold property in the names of trustees,
who might sue or be sued in respect thereto; remedies were provided against officers
embezzling union funds; and the unions were obliged to file certain information and
include certain provisions in their rules. Eight-ninths of union members belong to registered
unions, but these have registered less because of resultant benefits than to conform to
accepted standards. ROBERTS 18. Cf. the important privileges conditioned upon registration
under Taft-Hartley Act §§ 9(f)-9(h). See note 136 infra.
53. Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Socy of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426.
54. Both views were put forth in Taff Vale, but no choice between them was neces-
sary to the decision and much of the language was ambiguous on the point. See Bonsor
v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 121-25, 129-31, 139-41, 150-51, 155 (1955). Cf. note
44 supra.
55. Four of the five opinions in Taff Vale voiced agreement with the trial court
opinion of Farwell, J., [1901] A.C. 426-33, and Lord Shand, whose own position is least
clear, expressly concurred in Farwell's "reasoning." Farwell quite clearly did not con-
sider the suit a type of representative action, saying the closest analogy was a case like
Ruck v. Williams, 3 H. & N. 308, 157 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. 1858). The latter was an action
for damages against unincorporated improvement commissioners, "a quasi corporate
body" sued "in their quasi corporate character" and having no personal interest in the
result. Id. at 319-20, 157 Eng. Rep. at 493. Nor could Ruck have been a representative
action, since such actions did not exist at law until the Judicature Act of 1873. Likewise
the argument in Taff Vale and Bonsor that Parliament intended the Trade Union Act of
1871 to provide an alternative type of representative suit seems to overlook the fact that
such suits at law did not yet exist. Parliament would more likely have viewed the
action as the already familiar suit against a corporate or quasi-corporate body.
Moreover, Farwell based his interpretation of the Trade Union Act on the construction
of an act creating a corporation in Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866),
saying: "The proper rule of construction of statutes such as these is that in the absence
of express contrary intention the Legislature intends that the creature of the statute shall have
the same duties, and that its funds shall be subject to the same liabilities as the general law
would impose on a private individual doing the same thing." Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalga-
mated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 430-31. (Emphasis added.) Thus for
Farwell a trade union is a "creature of the statute" in the same sense as a corporation.
He later called it a "statutory legal entity." Osborne v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Ser-
vants, [1909] 1 Ch. 163, 191 (1908).
Contemporary commentators likewise regarded Taff Vale as a suit against the union
in a quasi-corporate rather than a representative character. See CHALI'TES-HLTNT, THE
LAw RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS 203-05 (1902); ERSKINE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF SCOTLAND 262 (20th ed., Rankine 1903).
The House of Lords decisions and dicta after Taff Vale, relied on in the various argu-
ments in Bonsor, are not decisive either way. However, no citation is made of the seem-
ingly persuasive Privy Council case from Canada (where the British Trade Union
Act was substantially reenacted in 1872), White v. Kuzych, [1951] A.C. 585 (P.C.).
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and was adopted into American law in Coronado.56 But most important is
the unanimous recognition in Bonsor, as in Taff Vale, that unions are not
inherently incapable of being juridical persons and that statutes conferring
rights and duties on unions can, without express enactment but by necessary
implication, make them juridical persons. The decision's chief signficance is
thus its method of statutory construction.5 7 This approach may be similarly
applied to relevant American statutes concerning unions.
The Supreme Court's Coronado decision should be interpreted as applying
this method of statutory construction to make unions juridical persons as a
matter of federal substantive law.r s Coronado is generally thought to have
established the "merely procedural" rule that any unincorporated association
may sue or be sued to enforce a federal substantive right.5 9 And federal rule
17(b) is said to "codify" the decision.60 But as to unions, distinct from
There the by-laws provided that a member's acceptance of them was "a contract with this
union and with every other member therein." (Emphasis added.) The Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council implicitly recognized the union rules constituted a contract
between the member and the union as a distinct entity, since it unanimously reversed
a wrongfully expelled member's judgment for damages because he had breached his
contractual obligation to the union to exhaust internal remedies. It seems more than
chance that the two Lords who in Bonsor held unions juridical persons, see text at note 38
supra, had also sat on Kuzqych, while the other three had not. On the other hand, an argu-
ment against the juridical person interpretation of Taff Vale can be made from the fact
that one of the judges who upheld the aggregate theory in Kelly (Swinfen-Eady, L.J.) is
listed as counsel against the union in Taff Vale, [1901] A.C. at 434, and must have felt
that his arguments there had not won the House's acceptance of the juridical person theory.
56. See text at notes 58-69 infra.
57. Lloyd, Damages for Wrongful Expulsion from a Trade Union: Bonsor v.
Musicians" Union, 19 MODERN L. REv. 121, 128 (1956). See also LLOYD, UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS 161 (1938). Cf. London Ass'n v. Greenlands, Ltd., [1916) 2 A.C. 15, 38
(association not "creation of statute," hence not suable).
58. See 259 U.S. at 390-91.
Coronado, arising out of a violent strike, was a treble damage action under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). Suit was brought in Arkansas
federal district court against the United Mine Workers international union and its officers,
one area district of the UMW and its officers, 27 local unions in the district and their
ufficers, and 65 individuals, most of whom were members of one of the unions. The
unions appealed to the Supreme Court from a heavy damage judgment. They maintained that
unincorporated labor unions could not be parties to an action or subject to a judgment.
See id. at 346-50; WARREN 652-58. The unions lost on this point, although the judgment
was reversed on other grounds. Not until after a second Supreme Court decision, 268
U.S. 295 (1925), and a fourth trial was the case finally settled for a small amount.
See LiEnERIAN, UNIONS BEFoRE THE BAR 141-63 (1950).
59. E.g., Busby v. Electric Utilities Union, 323 U.S. 72, 76-77 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (1944), on remand, 147 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945); 3 MooRE 1412 & n.21
(1948) ; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 203 (2d ed. 1947) ; Frankfurter, The Coronado Case, 31
Nnv REPr iunc 328, 329 (1922). But cf. Roberts, Labor Unions, Corpora tions-The Cor-
onado Case, 5 ILL. L.Q. 200 (1923). See also note 67 infra.
60. See sources cited note 59 supra; note 27 supra. But cf. HART & WECHSLER. THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSIMI 965-66 (1953).
The argument of Frankfurter, J., in Busby, supra note 59, begs the question. In his
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other unincorporated associations, 61 Coronado went much further.62 Although
the union was sued under the Sherman Act, the Court's unanimous conclusion,
that unions could be sued and held liable for acts of their agents, rested upon
considerations independent of the act. 3 This rule was not limited to cases
view, because the Court which incorporated Coronado into a rule of procedure lacked
power to make substantive changes, Coronado must be procedural. The issue remains
whether it is a misinterpretation of Coronado to call it "merely procedural." See note
67 infra.
61. See United States & Cuban Allied Works Engineering Corp. v. Lloyds, 291 Fed.
889, 891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) : "[Coronado] turned upon the character of a trade union as
such .... It is to be read as applicable only to such cases."
62. The impression that Coronado applies to other unincorporated associations in the
same manner as to unions stems from confusing the basic holding, limited to unions,
with the alternative holding based on the Sherman Act and applicable also to other
associations. See notes 63, 64, 69 infra. I.e., 3 Mooa 1408-09 states: "In [Coronado]
the Supreme Court held that an unincorporated labor union was suable as an entity,
for the purpose of enforcing against it a federal substantive right, although the state
court of the forum had earlier refused to recognize that it was so suable." (Emphasis
altered.) From this interpretation of Coronado, rule 17(b), see note 27 supra, readily
follows and has equal application to all associations. But the italicized phrase, being
the alternative holding, must be deleted to extract the broader holding applicable to
unions in particular, which goes beyond 17(b). This conflict between the broader holding
and 17(b) was called to the Supreme Court's attention by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals' Certificate, p.3, in Busby v. Electric Utilities Union, 323 U.S. 72 (1944).
But the Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question. Id. at 72-77. Cf. Na-
tional Ass'n of Industrial Ins. Agents v. CIO, 25 F. Supp. 540 (D.D.C. 1938) (Coronado
makes union suable in D.C. although cause of action is non-federal).
Contemporary courts and commentators tended to take the broader view of Coronado.
See 3 M ORE 1411; Annot., 27 A.L.R. 786, 789 (1923).
As applied to associations other than unions, e.g., Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924), the broad view was unwarranted. As to them,
Busby v. Electric Utilities Union, supra at 76 (concurring opinion), correctly said the
scope of Coronado was authoritatively defined in Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134,
141 (1928) and 'Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113, 118 (1933) (neither
involve unions, both treat the Coronado alternative holding as the only one applicable).
But neither these nor other Supreme Court cases have passed on the issue of whether
the broad holding in Coronado is still valid as to unions. Dicta in United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 703 & n.5 (1944), seem to indicate that it is. See note 70 infra and accom-
panying text.
63. 259 U.S. at 383-91. The Court then briefly added that its conclusion was "con-
firmied in the case at bar" by specific provisions of the Sherman Act applicable to any
"associations existing under or authorized by" federal or state laws. Id. at 392. (Emphasis
added.) Undoubtedly, had the Court not wished to announce the broader rule, it could
have rested the decision solely on the Sherman Act provisions, as the lower courts had
done. See 235 Fed. 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1916), 258 Fed. 829, 837 (8th Cir. 1919). In fact
that was what the Coronado Company's counsel asked, 259 U.S. at 364-67; see WARREN 660.
But an amicus brief seeking the broader holding provided the arguments the Court
accepted. Compare 259 U.S. at 376-81, with id. at 383-92; see note 66 infra. WARREN
661-65, though advocating that the decision should have been based on the Sherman Act
alone, concedes that it was not. See also Magill & Magill, The Suability of Labor Unions,
1 N.C.L. REV. 81, 84-86 (1922) (holding not based on Sherman Act). But cf. LLOYD,
UNINCORPORATED AssociATnoNs 161-63 (1938) (holding based on Sherman Act).
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enforcing Sherman Act or other federal substantive rights.64 Rather the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Taft, reasoned by analogy from Taff Vale:
federal statutes "recognizing" unions' existence were utilized as in the English
decision to reach the same result on suability and liability.6 5 Other sources
cited in the opinion also conceived of unions as juridical persons akin to cor-
porations. 66 Finally, suability of the union must have resulted from federal
substantive law. 67 If suability were only procedural, state law, which if applic-
64. "[W]e think that [unions] are suable in the federal courts for their acts, and
that funds accumulated to be expended in conducting strikes are subject to execution in
suits for torts committed by such unions in strikes." 259 U.S. at 391. Not only is this
statement unrestricted to suits on federal substantive rights, but it clearly envisions suits
for common law torts and other liability-creating "acts" involving no federal question.
These presumably would be cognizable in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction.
See text following note 172 infra.
65. 259 U.S. at 390-91. The analogy is carefully drawn. See note 66 infra. See also
Roberts, Labor Unions, Corporations-The Coronado Case, 5 ILL L.Q. 200 (1923).
In addition to the reasoning of Taff Vale, Taft was plainly influenced as well by his
observations of the nature of the union as a unified "business entity, distinct from its
members," recognized as such by statutory and case-law developments. See 259 U.S.
at 383-89; cf. Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARv. L. REV.
977, 1003-06 (1929). Taft's reasoning closely parallels that of an opinion in which he
concurred as a circuit judge, Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. 585
(6th Cir. 1898). See note 182 infra.
In Coronado Taft apparently accepted the argument of union counsel that the union
cannot be held unless it is a juridical person. 259 U.S. at 350, 352. But he found that
its characteristics made it one. Cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933)
(sociedad en comandita has all necessary characteristics of juridical person) ; Liverpool
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870) ; Morrison v. Standard Building
Soc'y, [1932] A.D. 229 (Sup. Ct. South Africa) ; American Federation of Musicians v.
Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 685 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954) (union in Coronado
had characteristics of juridical person). See also note 177 infra.
66. Aside from Taff Vale, Taft's analogy, 259 U.S. at 390, cited three sources inter-
preting Taff Vale: Hillenbrand v. Building Trade Council, 14 Ohio Dec. 628 (Super. Ct.
1904) ; HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 341 (12th ed. 1916) ; POLLOCK, FIRST Boox ON JuRIs-
PRUDENCE 125 (2d ed. 1904). Whether Taff Vale actually premised union suability on
the representative suit or juridical personality concept, see notes 54-55 Supra and accom-
panying text, these sources make clear Taft adopted the latter into American law.
All three were presented only in the amicus brief, arguing for juridical personality. 259
U.S. at 377, 381; see note 63 supra. Hillenbrand, at 642-51, seems a model for Taft's
opinion. It moves from a description of the nature of trade unions, "having many of the
characteristics of corporate bodies," to confirming their entity status by analogy of Ohio
statutes to the British trade union acts. HOLLAND 341 points out the important differences
between an aggregate of individuals and an "artificial person" such as a corporation or
trade union. POLLOCK 125, also considering "artificial persons," likens the vicarious
union liability of Taff Vale to that of a corporation. "Artificial person" is also the term
Taft applied to unions in Coronado. 259 U.S. at 388, 390.
67. The misunderstanding of Coronado is due more than anything else to the phrase,
often taken out of context, "the suability of trades unions . . . is after all in essence and
principle merely a procedural matter." 259 U.S. at 390. (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., sources
cited note 59 supra; Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV.
L. Rpv. 977, 1002 (1929). The subject of the full sentence is not "suability" but "such a
conclusion as to suability," i.e., the conclusion of Taff Vale that the union was subject
19571
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
able in Coronado would have prohibited suability, would have governed under
the Conformity Act.68 But Taft specifically stated the Conformity Act did
not apply to suability of unions.69
Statute Law: A Method of Construction
The case for juridical personality of unions is further strengthened by sub-
sequent enactment of labor legislation far more entensive than that existing
when the Supreme Court decided Coronado. The Court recognized this in
1944 in United States v. White,70 which held that a union's property was distinct
to suit and judgment as a quasi-corporate artificial person. The omitted part of the
passage itself refers to "the existence of such powerful entities as trade unions." The
portion of the opinion immediately following that passage suggests the "procedural matter"
Taft had in mind. As a matter of substantive law, the union as an entity, and each mem-
ber as an individual, incurred liability. The "procedural matter" was one of choosing
which of the joint tortfeasors to proceed against. A plaintiff might, as in the Danbury
Hatters' case, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), prefer redress against the individual members. See
LIEERMAN, UNIONs BEFORE THE BAR 58-59 (1950). But in a union of 400,000, such redress
would be impossible. Taff Vale showed that statutes not explicitly conferring on unions
power to sue mad liability to be sued nevertheless did so by implication. American statutes
do likewise. Thus the union alone could be sued, or as in Coronado, joined with some
individual members as joint tortfeasors, and the "procedural" problem solved. Cf. Pirnie
Simons & Co. v. New York Stock Exchange, 89 N.Y.L.J. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). Suability
of the union is, in a sense, a "procedural" question, as it would be of a corporation, but
the status from which suability derives is substantive.
STavENs, CoRpoRATIoNs 42 n.72 (2d ed. 1949) states that if the judgment in Coronado
could be satisfied only out of union assets, "then the decision must be regarded as chang-
ing the substantive law." Since the judgment was reversed on other grounds, the ques-
tion was not explicitly resolved. But plaintiff's counsel aclowledged the judgment
would not run against the members, 259 U.S. at 368, and Taft gave no indication that
judgment against the union could be executed other than on its funds. Id. at 391. In
fact he implied just the opposite. Id. at 402-03. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to
allow such a judgment against the union as an entity unless it enjoys juridical person
status as a matter of federal substantive law. If it is an entity only for purposes of the
Sherman Act suit, then under state law the union property remains that of the individual
members, and there is no entity property on which to execute the federal judgment. See WaR-
REN 666. Since Taft emphasized that execution would be levied on the common funds, he must
have considered those funds property of the union-juridical person.
68. The Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, 17 STAT. 196. Subsequently replaced by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the act provided that suits at law should conform "as
near as may be" to state procedures in "like causes."
69. 259 U.S. at 391. Taft, here again deliberately choosing the broad ground for
decision, was referring to all suits in federal courts. He was not considering specific
exceptions to the Conformity Act in a Sherman Act case, as was done in Pirnie Simons
& Co. v. New York Stock Exchange, 89 N.Y.L.J. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). See also note
63 supra. Nor can it be said that the Conformity Act would have had no application to an
antitrust suit, since one of the other issues in Coronado was decided on the basis of the
Conformity Act. 259 U.S. at 382-83. And plaintiff's counsel were evidently under the
impression they had brought the suit as a representative action in accord with Con-
formity Act procedures. WaRRxN 665-66.
70. 322 U.S. 694, 703 & n.5 (1944). From Coronado and White, the Seventh Circuit
observed: "It follows that the entity of the [union] is as much separate and apart from
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from that of its members and a union official therefore could not invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination to withhold subpoenaed union records.
W1hite, moreover, was decided prior to enactment of the most comprehensive
labor statute to date, the Taft-Hartley Act, which stressed the differentiation of
union from members.71 American legislation now has much stronger impli-
cations of union juridical personality than the British statutes involved in
Taff Vale 7- and Bonsor. The latter were permissive, requiring no affirmative
recognition or even toleration of unions by employers.73 But the Wagner Act,
with the avowed purpose of encouraging the development of collective bar-
gaining,74 affirmatively secured the right to organize unions and to compel
employer recognition. 75 If the theory is valid that corporations enjoy legal
personality because the state has granted them a "concession" to exist,
76 it
should apply even more so to unions, which experienced tremendous growth
as a result of the act.77 Moreover, the language of the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts, unlike that of the British Trade Union Act, consistently treats
a union as an entity rather than an aggregate.78 Predicated on the belief that
the union's interest may often conflict with that of its members,79 Taft-Hartley
clearly deals with the union as distinct from its members.80 It specifically
the individual members as that of a corporation is from its stockholders." Superior
Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930
(1951).
71. See, e.g., §§ 1(b), 301(b). See also note 30 supra.
72. Cf. Pullman Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928, United Steelworkers, 152 F.2d 493, 499 (7th
Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
73. See Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in THE SvsTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RAIONrS
IN GREAT BRITAIN 42, 52-55 (Flanders & Clegg ed., 1954).
74. Section 1. See also Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 2, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102
(1952); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) ; Cox, LABOR LAW 137 (3d ed.
1954) ; DuNLoP, COLLECrIvE BARGAINING 17-18 (1949). The Taft-Hartley Act reiterated
that collective bargaining was national policy, in reenacting § I of the Wagner Act and
in § 201(a).
75. Sections 7,8,9.
76. See, e.g., STEVENs, CORPOArTIONs § 1 (1936).
77. See Saposs, supra note 30, at 24; Melvin, The Use of Injunctions in Labor Dis-
putes, 36 A.B.A.J. 1007, 1058 (1950) ; Cox, LABOR LAW 134 (3d ed. 1954) (increase from
approximately 3 to 12 million union members in decade after 1933). The Wagner Act's
predecessor, § 7(a) of the N.I.R.A., 48 STAT. 195 (1933), also contributed to the growth.
See Cox, op. cit. supra at 136-37.
Under the Wagner Act many employers were compelled by court order "to deal with
a labor union in the manner contemplated by the Act. We know of none who has not re-
garded such union as a legal entity in a very real sense." Pullman Mfg. Co. v. Local
2928, United Steelworkers, 152 F.2d 493, 498 (7th Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion). But Cf.
id. at 493-97.
78. E.g., compare § 8 of the Wagner Act as amended by Taft-Hartley and § 301(b)
of Taft-Hartley, with § 4 of the British Trade Union Act, 1871. See Bonsor v. Musicians'
Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 135-39 (1955).
79. E.g., §§ 1(b), 8(b) (1), (2). See also note 30 supra.
80. "The Common Law concept of an unincorporated labor organization as a group
of individuals having no separate entity apart from its members has been discarded
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provides in sections 301 and 303 for unions to sue and be sued by employers
and other unions in connection with their most important activities: collective
bargaining and economic coercion.8 1 Under section 301(b) the union's col-
lective liability replaces the several liability of its members.8 2 The members
are given "all the advantages of limited liability without incorporation."8' 3
The Method Applied: Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act
An analysis of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,8 4 which governs suits
involving unions, affords the dearest indication that unions should be recog-
-to the extent that it was not already outmoded in modern jurisprudence-by the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. It is clear that the Act treats labor
organizations, for all practical purposes, as juridical entities. See Sections 2(1) and
2(b) of the Act; also Title III . .. Section 301."
International Longshoremen's Union, C.I.O., 79 N.L.R1B. 1487, 1507-08 & n.40 (1948).
81. See note 84 infra.
82. See text at note 86 infra.
83. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
84. "Section 301. (a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be en-
forceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall
not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
"(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations
in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have
jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization
maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized
officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
"(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any court of
the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity
as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
"(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting
as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for
his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized
or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
Section 303(a) provides that the commission of the same acts proscribed in § 8(b) (4)
as union unfair labor practices shall be unlawful. Section 303 (b) states:
"Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of] any viola-
tion of subsection (a) may sue therefore in any district court of the United States
subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to
the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the
parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."
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nized as juridical persons created by federal substantive law. Upon this recog-
nition depend both the validity of important provisions of section 301 and, in
view of the Supreme Court's interpretation in the Westinghouse case,8 5 the
attainment of the aims sought by Congress in enacting the section. In particu-
lar, section 301 (b) must be considered either as itself contributing to juridical
person status or as predicated on a tacit assumption that other legislation had
created such status and section 301 merely declared some of its consequences.
The result is the same under either view.
Although the range of legal situations in which section 301 (b) applies re-
mains unclear, all possible applications compel acceptance of the juridical per-
son concept of unions. Section 301 (b) contains three separate provisions: unions
are bound by the acts of their agents, they may sue or be sued as entities in
federal courts, and money judgments obtained may be executed only against
their assets, not those of members."" The section may be construed in two
ways. Its language is ostensibly of general applicability, and a sparse legisla-
tive history also suggests this interpretation.8 7 On the other hand, it has
been contended that the section applies only to suits under sections 301(a)
and 303.88 Under either the general or restricted view of the section's applica-
bility, its provisions taken together appear consistent only with a juridical person,
not an aggregate, theory.8 9
Under the restricted interpretation section 301(b) applies in whatever suits
may be brought under 301 (a), although the nature of 301 (a) suits is itself
disputed. Section 301(a) permits federal courts to entertain employer-union
suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts, and also some (or possibly
all) 90 suits between unions. By restricting the cause of action for violation
of the bargaining agreement to employer and union and excluding individual
employees,' section 301(a) treats the contract as one between two juridical
85. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955).
86. See note 84 supra.
87. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947) ; Rock Drilling Union v. Mason
& Hanger Co., 90 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 217 F.2d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955).
88. Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEmP.
L.Q. 1, 6 (1954); Kaye & Allen, The Suability of Unions, 1 LAB. L.J. 705, 706 (1950).
See also Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F. Supp. 175, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
89. Significantly, the one case cited by the Senate minority report to show § 301
was unnecessary involved an incorporated union. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 13 (1947), citing Nederlandsch Amerikaanische Stoomvart Maatschappij v.
Stevedores Benevolent Soc'y, 265 Fed. 397 (E.D. La. 1920).
90. See notes 114-16 infra and accompanying text.
91. Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1956); United Protective Workers
v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Disanti v. Local 53, 126 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. Pa. 1954) ; Silverton v. Rich, 119 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (collecting cases);
Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669, 672
(S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950); 2
TELLER 62, 175, 177 (Supp. 1950). See also Association of Westinghouse Employees v.
Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 457-59, 464 (1955); note 115 infra. But cf. Kendall
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 94 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (railway union contract).
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persons. The Supreme Court in Westinghouse disagreed as to whether 301 (a)
was solely a jurisdictional grant and the contract cause of action was still state-
created, 301 (a) merely providing a federal forum, or whether the section
created a federal cause of action.92 Although a majority appears to have
favored the former interpretation, 9 3 some courts of appeals have continued to
favor the latter.0 4 Because of these conflicting views, the effect of applying
301 (b) to both a state and a federally-created cause of action brought under
301(a) will be examined.
If the 301 (a) cause of action enforces state-created substantive rights to
contract performance, 301 (b)'s provisions undoubtedly require treatment of
the union as a juridical person in such suits. State laws to the contrary will be
disregarded,9 5 for it is not disputed that 301 was enacted precisely to nullify
their effect. 96 The crucial point is whether the 301 (b) provisions may, as
Justice Frankfurter thought in Westinghouse, be regarded as "procedural.
' '9 T
Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 98 the enforcement of state-created rights should
be the same in a federal as in a state tribunal. Since 301 (b) was intended to
be and is "outcome determinative," 99 application of its provisions as "pro-
92. See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartiey
Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956) (hereinafter cited as Mendelsohn); Wollett &
Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445 (1955);
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rav. 1297 (1954).
93. See Mendelsohn 171; Wollett & Wellington, supra note 92. 2 TELLER 46, 175
(Supp. 1950) supports the same interpretation.
94. See Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 300 (2d
Cir. 1956); Local 25, Teamsters Union, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 579-82
(1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956) ; cf. Local 205, United Elec. Workers v.
General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 94 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822 (1956) ; Inter-
national Ladies Garment Workers, AFL v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956).
See also Mendelsohn 171 n.16.
The uncertainties Westinghouse raised may soon be clarified by the Supreme Court,
which has granted certiorari in three § 301 cases: Local 205, United Elec. Workers v.
General Elec. Co., supra; Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, AFL, 233
F.2d 104 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822 (1956) ; Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers
Union, CIO, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 821 (1956).
95. E.g., Local 25, Teamsters Union, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 582
(1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International
Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Schatte v. International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669, 672-3, (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d
158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
96. See, e.g., S. REPT. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947) ; 2 TELER 179 (Supp.
1950); Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437,
446-49 (1955).
97. Id. at 443, 449. Accord: Wollett & Wellington, supra note 92, at 473. See also
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REV.
274,303-05 (1948).
However, Justice Frankfurter's statement in Westinghouse, 348 U.S. at 444, that
English courts would likewise interpret the statute procedurally, is refuted by the sub-
stantive interpretation given to weaker legislative language in Bonsor.
98. 304U.S.64 (1938).
99. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (rule substantially
affecting result of litigation is "outcome-determinative" for Erie purposes).
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cedural" rules would violate the Erie principle. 00 And where state law denies
the union's capacity to sue or be sued, the "procedural" view of 301 (b) would
also violate the rule derived from Angel v. Bullington: that a party lacking ca-
100. Eric itself was a diversity case. However, under Justice Frankfurter's view of §
301, "Congress merely furnished a federal forum for enforcing the body of contract law
which the States provide.. . ." 348 U.S. at 442, 443-49. State courts apparently retain
concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, although the parties are not necessarily of diverse citi-
zenship, a federal court's role in § 301 jurisdiction seems indistinguishable from its function
when exercising concurrent jurisdiction to enforce state law in diversity cases. In di-
versity, the Supreme Court has held the federal court to be in substance "only
another court of the state"; hence Erie bars it from applying "outcome determinative"
federal rules of procedure. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945);
Bernlardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). Accordingly, under Justice
Frankfurter's view that "all it [§ 301] does is to give procedural directions to the
federal courts," 348 U.S. at 443, those directions, when "outcome determinative," like-
wise should be barred by Erie. Cf. Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. International
Molders Union, 193 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (192)
(outcome-determinative state law held to apply even on assumption that § 301 rights were
federally-created). But see Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233
F.2d 85, 95 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822 (1956) (§ 301 suit distinguished from
diversity suit).
The extent to which Erie applies to enforcement of state law in federal nondiversity
cases is not yet clearly defined. Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity
Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 66, 67 (1955). Courts have recognized Erie's applicability
in some nondiversity situations. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine it Bankruptcy, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 1013, 1034 (1953) ; Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Oin-
nipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 280-81 (1946); HART & WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTinx 697 (1953). Guaranty Trust, supra
at 101, divided cases for Erie purposes into only two categories: those "adjudicating a
claim based on a federal law," and those where "rights and obligations are created by
one of the States, and for the assertion of which, in case of diversity of the citizenship
of the parties, Congress has made a federal court another available forum." (Emphasis
added.) Section 301 cases on state-created rights are clearly in the latter category. The
italicized phrase simply states the condition, as to the character of the parties, that Congress
attached for access to the alternative forum. Where Congress' condition is instead that
the character of the parties be union and employer, the rest of the statement should not
be affected.
Erie rests on three bases: a strong policy against forum-shopping, an interpretation
of the Rules of Decision Act (28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1952)), and a constitutional requirement
compelling that interpretation to avoid infringement of state judicial power. See 304 U.S.
at 74-80. All three seem applicable to § 301 cases if § 301 (a) creates no federal rights
and § 301(b) is "merely procedural." The anti-forum-shopping policy has been most
emphasized in the Supreme Court's post-Erie decisions. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust, supra;
Bernhardt, supra; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUA. L.
R-v. 489, 512-13 (1954). Although this policy applies in diversity to the nonresident
forum-shopper, it is even more applicable when the forum-shopper need not be a nonresident.
Otherwise, where concurrent § 301 and state-court jurisdiction exist, a resident plaintiff
could freely choose his court and his result. And a nonresident plaintiff could, by invoking
jurisdiction under § 301 instead of diversity, evade Erie's restrictions.
The Rules of Decision Act is applicable in nondiversity cases. E.g., Chattanooga
Foundry and Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) ; Hill, The Erie Doctrine
in Bankruptcy, 66 HAIv. L. REv. 1013, 1034-35 (1953).
The constitutional basis of Erie long remained uncertain. See id. at 1031-33. But in
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pacity in a state's courts cannot be given capacity to enforce a non-federal right
in federal courts in that state.1' 1 But if 301 (b) is itself "substantive" law, any
objections based on Erie and Angel disappear, for under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution federal substantive law supersedes conflicting state pro-
visions. 10 2 The union's situation is analogous to that of a federally-created
corporation sued on a state-created contract cause of action.10 3 Federal sub-
stantive law determines that the corporation has capacity to be sued,10 4 that
judgment may not be executed against the stockholders' personal assets, and
that the corporation may be bound by its agents. State substantive law de-
termines whether the agent validly bound the corporation, whether the contract
was breached, and the measure of damages. The corporation's case would be
cognizable in the federal district court if Congress had made a special grant
of federal jurisdiction, like 301 (a) ; otherwise only the state courts could en-
tertain the action.'0 5 But the foregoing "substantive" rules would apply equally
in- either instance.
1956 it was reaffirmed in Bernhardt, supra. The case held the United States Arbitration
Act inapplicable to diversity cases not involving interstate commerce to avoid probably
unconstitutional infringement of state powers by the "outcome determinative" federal en-
forcement of arbitration. See The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. REv. 83, 137-
41 (1956). The constitutional doubts would seem equally strong in applying the "out-
come determinative" rules of § 301 (b) if § 301 is merely procedural. In Wilson & Co.
v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), the constitution-
ality of § 301 (b) was sustained as not invading state powers only by holding that § 301 (a)
created a federal substantive right, so that federal procedures applied to its enforcement.
101. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) ; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535 (1949).
MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 318 (1949) points out that Angel quali-
fies rule 17(b) insofar as the latter implies a party may have capacity to sue on state-
created rights in federal courts despite the forum state's law. Angel must similarly
qualify § 301(b) if that section be considered an amendment to Rule 17(b), as it was in
Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 90 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1950),
aff'd, 217 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955), and apparently in
Justice Frankfurter's Westinghouse opinion that § 301 merely gave "procedural directions
to the federal courts."
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Car-
riers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local
2928, United Steelworkers, 152 F.2d 493, 497-99 (7th Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
The application of the supremacy clause has been particularly extended in the labor field.
Thus, even a "private agreement" made pursuant to federal law has been held to supersede
state law. Railway Employes' Dep't AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
103. See International Ladies Garment Workers, AFL v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d
632 (5th Cir. 1956) (union likened to federally-created corporation suing on state-created
right). Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 823-28 (1824).
Unions were frequently likened to corporations in the congressional debate on § 301. E.g.,
93 CONG. REc. 3839, 6521 (1947).
104. In some cases capacity may be implied without express statutory direction. See
3 MOORE 1403.
105. See cases cited note 103 supra. According to Jay-Ann, however, § 301(a) was
not a grant of federal jurisdiction absent the normal federal question. 228 F.2d at 634.
28 U.S.C. § 1349 bars federal jurisdiction based merely on grounds of federal incorporation.
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Alternatively, if section 301 (a) creates a federal substantive right to contract
performance, all the foregoing questions would be decided as matters of federal
law. Although affixing a "procedural" label to 301 (b)'s provisions in this
context would not raise questions as to their validity,10 6 it would nevertheless be
inaccurate. The determination and incidence of liability for breach of contract
would still depend on the 301 (b) rules.107 In their absence the Norris-La
Guardia rule would apply: that an agent's authorization or ratification must
be proved to bind the union.' 0 s And under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
69 judgment could be executed on members' personal assets where state law
so allowed.1 9 Moreover, if 301 (a) creates a federal substantive right, it may
well pre-empt state law on collective bargaining contracts." 0 Thus the section
301 concept that the union enters a collective bargaining relationship as a
juridical person would pro tanto supersede state denial of union juridical
personality."'
Congress was apparently concerned not with whether state or federal con-
tract law would apply, but with overcoming the barriers to contract enforce-
See also Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437,
450-51 (1955).
106. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809
(2d Cir. 1950); Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; cf. Local 25, Teamsters Union, AFL v. W. L. Mead Inc., 230 F.2d 576,
582 (1st Cir.), cert. dinnissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
107. See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 451 (1955).
108. Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 6, 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1952); United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1947). See United
Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 746-43 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824
(1954).
109. E.g., in South Carolina judgment against the union may be executed on the
personal property of members not served. S.C. CODE § 10-1516 (Supp. 1955) ; see Hall
v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955). The South Carolina statute might be
deemed to deprive unserved parties of property without due process of law. But the
provision probably could be upheld by analogy to Operative Plasterers' Ass'n v. Case,
93 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (default judgment against union did not violate due process
where service had been made on member who could reasonably be expected to give notice
to union) ; see also 3 MooRE 1408 n.5.
Federal rule 71 also contemplates enforcement of court orders against parties not served.
For cases applying local law under rule 69, see Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International
Longshoremen's Union, 128 F. Supp. 697, 705-06, 131 F. Supp. 866 (D. Hawaii 1955);
7 MooRE 2418-19.
110. See Mendelsolm 187-90.
111. The federal right might also be enforceable by or against the union as an
entity in state courts. Cf. Williams v. United Mine Workers, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S.W.2d
202 (1943). But cf. Bunch v. Launius, 222 Ark. 760, 262 S.W.2d 461 (1953).
Similarly, § 303 creates federal substantive rights pre-empting state law. Section
303(b) expressly allows these to be enforced in state courts, though without express
requirement that the liability-limiting, entity and agency provisions of § 301(b) be fol-
lowed. See note 84 supra. It is unlikely Congress intended all these § 301(b) provisions
to be circumvented in allowing § 303 actions to be brought in state instead of federal
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ability resulting from state nonrecognition of union juridical personality." 2
Accordingly the view that 301 creates a federal substantive right to performance
of collective bargaining contracts would be consistent with its intent.113 It is
difficult, however, to conceive what possible federal substantive right Congress
could have meant to create by the parallel 301(a) provision for suits between
unions.' 14 It is not even clear whether such suits are limited to "contract"
actions ;115 nor is any legislative history found showing what contracts Con-
gress imagined unions make with each other." 6 Congress apparently meant
court. This further supports the implication that Congress considered unions entities
created by federal substantive law, causing provisions like those of § 301(b) to bind
state courts without need for re-expression in § 303. Cf. International Longshoremen's
Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1952). But see Bunch v. Launius,
supra.
112. See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 444-49 (1955); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947); H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 45-46 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65
(1947) ; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
REv. 274,303-05 (1948).
113. See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 343 U.S.
437, 465 (1955) (dissenting opinion); Note, 57 YAix L.J. 630 (1948); cf. Mendelsohn
183-84 (the legislative intent cannot be clearly ascertained from the legislative history).
114. Section 301(a) encompasses "Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization .. . or between any such labor organizations . . . ..
(Emphasis added.) See note 84 supra.
115. There was considerable controversy as to whether "between an employer and
a labor organization" modified "suits" or "contracts," but the former interpretation
prevailed. See Mendelsohn 195 n.115; note 91 supra. Accordingly the second "between"
clause-"between any such labor organizations"-should likewise be taken to modify
"suits," and "for violation of contracts" limited to the employer-union provision in which
it appears. Thus § 301(a) would be read: "suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization . . .or [suits) between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States. . . ." Since Congress evinced
great concern with the difficulties of suing unions, see note 112 supra and accompanying
text, but none with failure of unions to honor contractual agreements among themselves,
this reading seems most plausible. The "contracts" with which Congress was concerned
were solely union-employer collective bargaining contracts. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947). However, Congress was concerned with inter-union
jurisdictional disputes, as evinced by its passage of §§ 8(b) (4) (D) and 303(a) (4)
of the act. It was suggested that under § 301 a declaratory judgment should be available
to resolve jurisdictional disputes, see 93 CONG. Rac. 3656-57 (1947) ; this may have been
a reason for the Conference Committee's decision to add to § 301 the provision for suits
between unions. See note 116 infra. But as such disputes are not generally over violations
of contracts between the competing unions, it would follow that § 301(a) jurisdiction
over inter-union suits was not intended to be limited to suits "for violation of contracts."
116. The § 301(a) provision for suits between unions did not appear in the original
version of either the House or Senate Bill. It was added by the Conference Committee,
but their report makes no reference to the reasons for its addition. See H.R. Rap. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947). The only reference to the addition was Senator Taft's
cryptic statement that the Conference Committee report differed from the Senate bill
in providing "that suits for violation of contracts between labor organizations, as well
as between a labor organization and an employer, may be brought in the Federal courts."
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state substantive law to apply in these inter-union 301 (a) suits, even if federal
substantive law applies in 301 (a) suits on collective bargaining contracts.1'7
Hence 301 (b) must be intended to govern in some suits on state-created rights,
even if 301 (b) is limited to 301 (a) and 303 suits."18 The argument based
on Erie and Angel, discussed above, consequently requires the substantive in-'
terpretation of 301 (b). In addition, if the 301 (a) jurisdictional grant is deemed
93 CONG. P\Ec. 6445 (1947). But there was no elaboration or discussion of what the inter-
union contracts were. And Senator Taft's thought that "between any such labor organi-
zations" in § 301(a) modified "contracts" rather than "suits" is merely a repetition of
his view that the first "between" clause did likewise. But the courts have rejected the
latter view. See notes 91 and 115 supra. Moreover, Taft's general philosophy that a
union should be suable and liable for the acts of its agents in the same manner as a cor-
poration is equally applicable to inter-union disputes. See 93 CONG. REc. 3839, 6521
(1947).
There has been little litigation to clarify the suits between unions provision. Snoots
v. Vejlupek, 87 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949), Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734 (N.D.N.Y.
1949), and Sun Shipbuilding Co. v. Industrial Union, 95 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1950),
seem correct in holding the provision inapplicable to intra-union disputes, although
these may involve violations of contractual obligations under union constitutions and
rules. But these intra-union cases give no reason for limiting inter-union § 301 suits
to contract actions. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
84 F. Supp. 669, 672 (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 827 (1950), did involve an inter-union dispute. It correctly held that a § 301
suit could not be maintained because not brought in the union's name; but the dictum
that an inter-union § 301 suit must be for "violation of a labor contract . . . between
labor organizations" is unelucidated and unsupported. Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107, 113
(1st Cir. 1956), relied solely on Senator Taft's remark, supra, in holding the second
"between" modified "contracts," not "suits," although the first "between" modified "suits."
However, the latter case, supra at 114-15, also made the interesting suggestion that unions
may be able to sue each other on a wide variety of claims (most of them apparently state-
created) under § 302(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act. This would establish a further cate-
gory of suits on state-created rights to which § 301(b) should be applicable.
The dearth of inter-union litigation under § 301, or elsewhere, should preclude the
argument that federal courts will be flooded with litigation if such suits are not limited
to contract cases. Cf. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp.,
348 U.S. 437, 460 (1955). Rather, under the view that in § 301 Congress made unions
"newly created legal entities," International Ladies Garment Workers, AFL v. Jay-Ann
Co., 228 F.2d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 1956), it seems very reasonable for Congress to provide
that the occasional lawsuits between such entities may be heard in federal courts.
117. In the case of § 301 (a) suits between employer and union, assuming that Con-
gress intended to create some federal substantive right, there is no question that the right
it had in mind was performance of collective bargaining agreements. Nor is it doubted
that state rights would be enforced in 301 (a) suits in the absence of a showing of congres-
sional intent to the contrary. See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westing-
house Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948) ; sources cited notes
92-94 supra. Since the legislative history of § 301 (a) reveals no congressional intent to
create federal rights as to relationships among unions, § 301 (a) inter-union suits must be
on state-created rights.
118. Section 303 suits enforce federal substantive rights. See International Long-
shoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952) ; Schatte v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
827 (1950) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 575 (1950).
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limited to suits enforcing federal substantive rights, the suability provision
of 301(b) must have been intended to apply to some suits involving state-
created rights. Otherwise the provision would be redundant, since federal
rule 17(b) already permits suability of a union as an entity to enforce a federal
substantive right." 9
Under the view that 301 (b) has general applicability, its substantive char-
acter is even clearer. In this instance, regardless of how 301 (a) is interpreted,
301 (b) must govern suits in federal courts enforcing state substantive rights,
e.g., in diversity jurisdiction. As shown above, 301(b) can not validly be
applied in such cases unless it is deemed substantive law predicated upon the
juridical person concept. 1 20 And if 301 (b) is applied in diversity suits, argu-
ments for a substantive interpretation of 301 (b) based on the Erie and Angel
rules are even more directly in point, since both cases were diversity proceed-
ings.
1 21
In enacting section 301, Congress intended to provide uniform means of
enforcing collective bargaining contracts.1 22 Holding unions juridical persons
as a matter of federal substantive law would fulfill this objective by binding
state as well as federal courts. Unlike federal rules of procedure, federal sub-
stantive law supersedes conflicting state provisions by virtue of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. As has been seen, only by such supersession is
301(b) valid.' 23 Thus state courts enforcing state-created rights (or of course
federal rights) should be required to regard a union as a juridical person
as they would any other federally-created juridical entity. Otherwise, where
an action was cognizable either in federal courts under 301 (a) or in state courts,
the choice of forum would determine not only the union's status in the litiga-
tion, but also whether the union had been a juridical person when the events
giving rise to the litigation occurred. 124 And where both diversity and 301 (a)
jurisdiction requirements were met in the same case, 125 two conflicting rules
119. In Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437,
454 (1955), the same argument was used to show § 301 (a) rights must be state-created.
120. See text at notes 98-102.
121. See notes 100-01 supra.
122. The Senate Committee report on 301 declared: "[U]ntil all jurisdictions, and
particularly the Federal Government, authorize actions against labor unions as legal en-
tities, there will not be the mutual responsibility necessary to vitalize collective bargaining
agreements." S. REP'. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947). See also id. at 15-18;
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 45-46 (1947) ; Association of Westinghouse Em-
ployees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 448 (1955) ; text at note 112 supra.
123. See text at note 102 supra.
124. E.g., in New York an agent's unratified act within the scope of his employment
would have bound the union under § 301(b) but not state law. See note 163 infra. A
similar situation would arise with § 303 suits, which may be brought in federal or state
courts. See note 111 supra.
125. E.g., United Elec. Workers v. Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir.
1956) ; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. A. L. Kornman Co., 30 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 69952
(M.D. Tenn., May 2, 1956) ; International Woodworkers v. McCloud River Lumber Co.,
119 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Cal. 1953) ; Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, International Long-
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of law would be applicable by the same federal court to the same operative
facts. 126 Apart from any Erie and supremacy clause considerations, a Con-
gress seeking uniformity should not be deemed to have intended such in-
consistent results. Rather the consistent outcome under supremacy clause
doctrine points to both a reason for and a desirable result of interpreting
301 (b) as substantive law.
Finally, the Westinghouse interpretation of 301 makes the juridical person-
ality concept indispensable if congressional objectives are to be met. Although
Congress may have expected that employers primarily would benefit from
the section, most 301 suits have been brought by unions against employers.
12 7
Usually these actions have been maintained by unions to enforce members'
claims; Westinghouse held, however, that 301 did not confer federal jurisdic-
tion over such suits.12s Thus unions are thrown back on the state courts,
whose previous failure to recognize them as juridical persons was the main
reason for enacting 301.129 Construing the statute to overcome this nonrecog-
nition would implement the congressional purpose despite Westinghouse." °
shoremen's Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953) ; cf.
Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 915 (1955) (diversity but not § 301 jurisdiction). If unions are deemed "citizens"
for diversity purposes, as suggested in text following note 172 infra, § 301 and diversity
jurisdiction would frequently be available in the same suit.
126. E.g., in Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85,
101-02 (Ist Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822 (1956), the union was denied entity status
necessary to maintain the suit in diversity while granted it to bring the suit under § 301.
Thus the union both was and was not an entity for the purpose of enforcing the same rights in
the same action at the same time.
127. See Mendelsohn 169 n.9, 197 n.123 (citing figures); Wyle, Unions int Search of
a Forunm to Enforce Contracts, 7 LAB. L.J. 425, 427 (1956).
128. See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 459-61 (1955); sources cited note 127 supra. Jurisdiction remains only for qua-
union claims, not claims accrued to individual employees. But the line is not always easy
to draw. See Mendelsohn 168 n.7, 196-97.
129. See notes 112 and 122 supra.
130. The method of statutory construction suggested in this Comment renders un-
necessary any express statutory language conferring entity status for all purposes. Were
express provision required, however, it might be found in the § 301 (b) clause authorizing
a union to sue or be sued as an entity "in the courts of the United States." The quoted
phrase might be read to include state courts. International Longshoremen's Union v.
Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 240-43 (1952) is precedent for such a liberal inter-
pretation. There a suit brought in the Alaska District Court was held within the § 303 (b)
authorization to sue "in any district court of the United States, subject to the limitations
and provisions of section 301 .. " Usually "district court of the United States" is limited
to courts established under Article III of the Constitution. But, the Supreme Court de-
cided, "Congress was here [in §§ 301 and 303] concerned with reshaping labor-management
legal relations . . . ," and ". . it is more consonant with the uniform, national policy of
the Act" to include in its coverage the non-Article III Alaska District Court.
"That reading of the Act does not, to be sure, take the words 'district court
of the United States' in their historic, technical sense. But literalness is no sure
touchstone of legislative purpose. The purpose here is more closely approximated,
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Even if Congress had shared Justice Frankfurter's impression that the pro-
visions of 301 were "procedural directions to the federal courts,"' 3'1 the sub-
stantive interpretation would be warranted to save the section's validity and
purpose.132 Moreover, constitutional doubts about the jurisdictional grant
of 301, which prompted the Westinghouse Court to interpret the section so
narrowly,133 may be eliminated by construing the Taft-Hartley Act to create
or confirm unions' juridical personality. There is little question that Con-
gress may confer federal jurisdiction over entities created by federal law.
1' 4
And the plenary power over commerce should enable Congress to compel state
as well as federal court recognition of juridical personality of all unions in
an industry affecting commerce,135 or at least all those certified by the NLRB.' s°
we believe, by giving the historic phrase a looser, more liberal meaning in the
special context of this legislation."
Id. at 243. The same policy warrants not restricting "the courts of the United States"
in § 301(b) to courts established by the Constitution, i.e., federal courts. Since Juneau
Spruce extended "any district court of the United States" (as used in §§ 301 (a) and 303)
to cover all federal courts where suit might be brought, and § 301 (b) 's language is broader
-"the courts [not just the district courts] of the United States'"-the latter phrase seems
to refer to state courts as well. Moreover, although the last sentence of § 301 (b) refers to
a "district court," the preceding reference to "courts of the United States" is not restricted
to federal courts, and accordingly the broad interpretation of the latter phrase seems appro-
priate in the context.
131. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437,
443 (1955).
132. Cf. id. at 453.
133. See id. at 459-61; Mendelsohn 168-69, 195.
134. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824);
Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288
U.S. 476, 485 (1933); Mishkin, The Federal "Questionm" in the District Courts, 53 CoLuM.
L. REv. 157, 160-61, 187 (1953). But cf. Association of Westinghouse Employees v.
Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 450-51 (1955).
Section 301(a) could be read as a statutory exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1349, which
strictly limits jurisdiction over federally-created corporations. Or alternatively, it might
be held there was no congressional intent to treat unions for purposes of § 1349 as
"corporation [s] ...incorporated by or under an Act of Congress." Ibid.
Removal of doubts as to § 301's constitutionality would not of itself enable the union-
juridical person to sue for employee claims. But once the constitutional question is re-
moved, it is difficult to support Westinghouse's contrary holding in the face of the man-
date of § 301 (b) : "[The union] may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the em-
ployees whom it represents .... ." (Emphasis added.) See Mendelsohn 194-201.
135. Section 301 covers: "Any labor organization which represents employees in
an industry affecting commerce. . . ." This is a much broader scope than the NLRB's
jurisdictional standards have ever encompassed, and few unions would fall outside it.
See, e.g., Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 808
(2d Cir. 1950).
136. Certification requires compliance with the filing requirements of §§ 9(f)-(h),
which resemble the registration requirements under the British Trade Union Act. Thus,
limiting juridical person status to filing unions is analogous to Bonsor's limiting it to
registered unions. See note 41 supra. But such a restriction seems unwarranted in American
law, since the Supreme Court has held that the only consequence of noncompliance with
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'INADEQUACIES OF THE "PRocEDuRAL" APPROACH
The foregoing statutory basis for holding unions juridical persons as a matter
of substantive law is further supported by the anomaly of the contrary view of
union suability as "merely a procedural matter." This approach surrenders the
possibility of uniformity, since Congress cannot establish procedural rules for
state jurisdictions.3 7 Under the "procedural" view, a suit against a union in
its common name differs only in convenience from the common law require-
ment of joining all members as defendants; the action is in effect a representative
suit against the members.Y38 The rule that members of an unincorporated
association are severally, not collectively, liable applies.' 39 Liability could only
be collective if a new jural person had been created. 140 But in practice a money
judgment against a union almost always represents the imposition of just such
collective liability. 41 Because of the continually fluctuating membership which
characterizes unions, the concept of a suit against the union as a representative
action could rarely be accurate. At the time the suit is instituted the members
will include some who did not belong when the cause of action accrued, and
therefore should not share in liability or be represented in the suit; others who
did belong then will have terminated membership and thus escaped liability.'4
the filing requirements is loss of NLRB assistance, including right to certification. United
Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 73-4 (1956). See also Note,
66 YALE L.J. 771 (1957). Moreover, a noncomplying union may still sue under § 301.
United Steelworkers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267 (W.D. Mich. 1949). On the
other hand, conditioning juridical person status on obtaining certification accords better
with the traditional idea that acquisition of corporate status depends on a voluntary act
by the group. See Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928, United Steelworkers,
152 F.2d 493, 497-99 (7th Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
Since railway unions are covered by the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952), rather than the Taft-Hartley Act, the text discussion of statutory
interpretation does not expressly apply to making them juridical persons. However, the
Railway Labor Act, like the Wagner Act, was designed to encourage collective bargaining
by unions. See, e.g., Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233
(1956). Unions certified under it have in consequence frequently litigated as entities, and
there seems no sound reason for denying them juridical personality possessed by other
unions. In fact railway unions receive more favorable treatment than unions under Taft-
Hartley, since the Railway Labor Act supersedes state "right to work" laws. Railway
Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, supra.
137. See notes 102 and 123 supra and accompanying text.
138. See Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426,
438-40, 445; WARREN 666.
139. Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, 410
(2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943) ; see note 12 supra; Comment, 32 YALE
L.J. 59, 62 n.17 (1922).
140. Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, supra note 139,
at 410. See also HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
965-66 (1953).
141. Section 301(b) expressly requires that liability be collective. And in Bonsor
even the proponents of the "procedural" interpretation conceded that the union was liable
"as an organized combination." [1956] A.C. 104, 145.
142. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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Under one suggestion, any member who had joined after the cause of action
accrued should have his non-liability entered on the record and his contribution
to the common property reserved in the judgment.143 Likewise, a member
who had withdrawn after the cause of action accrued would remain liable
from his private purse.144 Not only is the impracticability of such proposals
manifest in the case of large unions; but it was to avoid just such complications
that unions were made suable as entities in Coronado, Bonsor and the Taft-
Hartley Act. Thus an attempted solution to the problem of union suability
that truly is "merely procedural" is virtually no solution at all. The practical
solution of Coronado or Bonsor, however much it may be labeled "merely pro-
cedural,"'1 45 in fact alters the incidence of liability from those who were mem-
bers at the time of the actionable wrong to those who are members when the
judgment is executed. 1 46 Such shifting of liability makes sense only if predi-
cated on an underlying concept of the union as a continuing substantive
entity.
1 47
THE CONSEQUENCES OF JURIDICAL PERSONALITY
The case law and statutory basis for holding unions juridical persons is
supported by strong policy considerations. These derive from the procedural,
substantive and diversity-jurisdiction consequences that would result.
Procedure
Recognition of unions as juridical persons would eliminate the procedural
difficulties now attending suits involving unions.' 48 As has been noted, no
American jurisdiction presently recognizes unincorporated unions as com-
plete juridical persons; procedures for suing them ordinarily are assimilated
to the procedures used for other unincorporated associations.' 40 The applicable
federal rule, 17(b), follows state procedure, except where a federal substantive
right is involved.' 50 State rules vary from statutory provisions for "common
name" suits to the common law rule barring suits entirely.' 5' Other statutes
143. Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383,
403 n.66 (1924).
144. Id. at 402 n.66.
145. See note 59 supra.
146. See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 451 (1955); Lloyd, Damages for Wrongful Expulsion from a Trade Union: Bonsor
v. Musicians' Union, 19 MODERN L. REv. 121, 129 (1956).
147. See ibid.; cf. WARREN 665-66; VOET, COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECTS 541-42
(Gane ed., 1955). Likewise, the policy argument for holding the union liable emphasizes
the union's character as an entity in fact. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U.S. 344, 383-89 (1922).
148. See Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEmP.
L.Q. 1, 30 (1954).
149. See notes 8-18 supra and accompanying text.
150. See note 27 supra.
151. See Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955) ; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17
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allow for some type of representative action by or against appropriate officers.15 2
But representative suits present difficulties,1r  and even a successful plaintiff
may be unable to reach the union funds.154
No good reasons appear today for making the legal vindication of union
rights and responsibilities subject to such vagaries of procedure. The historical
opposition of union leaders to suability, which prompted many to regard Coro-
nado as a great defeat for labor,"55 may have been justified in a past generation.
At that time unions generally faced an unsympathetic judiciary, lacked legal
resources and had few important legal rights to enforce.156 If the harsh sub-
stantive law could not then be changed, 157 unions might achieve practical im-
munity through procedural bars to suit. But the great increase in union strength
and the acquisition of important legal rights requiring judicial enforcement
has changed the unions' traditional attitude. 58 Procedural bars are now more
(1947); Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEmP.
L.Q. 1 (1954) (collecting statutes and cases).
152. See ibid.
Substantive entity status should preclude suits brought by or against officers as repre-
sentatives of the union as it does in the case of corporations. Some who regard unions as
entities for procedural purposes only, have nevertheless suggested that provision for com-
mon name suits bars representative actions, since the latter are meant as extraordinary
remedies available only when joinder of an unreasonable number of parties would other-
wise be necessary. See Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132
F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943) ; Comment, 33 CALIF. L.
REv. 444, 446 (1945) ; 33 COLUm. L. REV. 363, 365 (1933). But see Walker v. Billingsley,
[1952] 5 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 363 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). The suggestion that § 301(b) pre-
cludes representative suits involving unions in federal courts was made in Schatte v. In-
ternational Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D. Cal. 1949),
but rejected in Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F. Supp. 175, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), followed in Copra
v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1956). But Tisa's basis meanwhile may have been
vitiated by the same court's holding several weeks later, that § 301 (b) has general appli-
cability as a federal rule of procedure. Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 90
F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
153. See Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 144, 146; CiTmINE, TRADE
UNIoN LAW 145-51, 456-60 (1950) ; Comment, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 444, 448 (1945).
154. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 233 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied on this
issue, 352 U.S. 890 (1956) ; New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Jenkins, 331 Mass. 720, 734-35,
122 N.E.2d 759, 767-68 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
155. See Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 59, 63-64 (1922). But see Frankfurter, The Coronado
Case, 31 NEW REPUBLIC 328 (1922) (labor would benefit from legal responsibility the
Coronado decision established) ; Brandeis, The Incorporation of Labor Unions, 15 GREEN
BAG 11 (1903) (similar argument).
156. See remarks of Samuel Gompers (1902), quoted in Roberts, Labor Unions, Cor-
porations-The Coronado Case, 5 ILL. L.Q. 200-01 (1923) ; LIEBERMAN, UNIONs BEFORE
THE BAR (1950).
157. Cf. Frankfurter, The Coronado Case, 31 NEW REP UBLIC 328, 330 (1922) (real
problem is securing equitable substantive law on union responsibility).
158. See, e.g., remarks of AFL General Counsel, quoted in Busby v. Electric Utilities
Employees Union, 147 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 59, 64 n.20
(1922).
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of a hindrance than a help.159 Desirable as it is that union-employer differences
be settled by arbitration and negotiation rather than suit,60 the ultimate sanc-
tions of the courts must be available to prevent these extra-legal adjustment
processes from breaking down. Immunities from suit should arise not as pro-
cedural loopholes in legislative policy but only as its deliberate product, as
in the case of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.161
Substantive law
The second major consequence of the juridical person concept would be to
alter and enhance the privileges and responsibilities of unions and their mem-
bers. Some new rights and obligations would be created and others now ex-
isting in theory would become enforceable in practice. Unions, like corporations,
would be liable for their agents' acts as they already are for purposes of the
Taft-Hartley Act.162 There would be an end to the "New York rule" under
which the union incurs liability as an entity only on a showing that each
member is liable, a condition almost impossible to meet. 6 3 Likewise the union
would acquire rights of action for injuries to it as an entity which would not
have created liability to the individual members. Libel against the union is an
example.164
In the sphere of union-member relations, the nature of union membership
rights and remedies would be clarified by the juridical person theory. 1615 Cur-
159. E.g., under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act the union is more often plaintiff than
defendant. See notes 127 and 128 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, in
injunction cases, in which the union typically is defendant, lack of entity status does not
impose procedural bars to suit, since equitable remedies have traditionally been available
against unions through the class suit device. See note 12 supra.
160. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv.
999 (1.955).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
162. See 2 TEu.a 70-75 (Supp. 1950).
However, juridical person status would not diminish the Norris-LaGuardia Act's limita-
tions on vicarious liability. These apply equally to corporate and unincorporated bodies.
See United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
163. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951), 37 CORNELL L.Q. 814
(1952). But cf. People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y. 101,
23 N.E. 129 (1889) (incorporated union held liable). See also S. REX. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1947) (extent to which "New York rule" followed).
164. Compare Kirkman v. Westchester Newspaper Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E.2d 919
(1942), and National Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [1946] K.B. 81
(C.A.), with Formica v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 19 L.R.R.M. 2029 (D.C. Ohio
1946).
165. Cf. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAiv. L. REv. 1049,
1100 (1951) (basic need is not so much for greater limitations on union discipline as for a
proper theory to rationalize them).
One remedy, damages for lost wages from wrongful expulsion, is now provided by the
Taft-Hartley Act. Radio Officers' Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). This ad-
ministrative remedy has been held to pre-empt the field, superseding state judicial remedies.
Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 214 F.2d 349 (9th Cir.), cert.
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rent law governing these relations is a confused mixture of property-right,
contract and status considerations. 166 Conceptualizing these relations as rooted
in contract between the union as a juridical person and the member would
provide an adequate framework for determining the rights and remedies of
each. 16 7 And a union could avail itself of a provision in the membership contract
granting it exclusive power to enforce members' claims under collective bar-
gaining agreements 16 ---a result highly recommended by the realities of in-
dustrial life and a majority of the Supreme Court in Westinghouse.169 Were
the union lax in enforcing such a claim, °7 0 or otherwise remiss in its obligation
to members, it should be suable as an entity in an action somewhat analogous
to a stockholder's suit against his corporation.
1 71
denied, 348 U.S. 855 (1954) ; Mahoney v. Sailors' Union, 45 Wash. 2d 453, 460, 275 P.2d
440, 445 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955) ; Real v. Curran, 285 App. Div. 552, 138
N.Y.S.2d 809 (1st Dep't 1955) ; see Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versts State
Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415, 483 (1956). Contra, International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 217-21, 298 P.2d 92, 99-101 (1956), cert. granted, 77 Sup.
Ct. 354 (1957) ; United Automobile Workers v. Hinz, 218 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1955).
166. E.g., Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 1048,
295 N.W. 858, 869 (1941) (wrongful expulsion deprives member of property-right);
Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) (wrongful expulsion a breach of con-
tract) ; Tunney v. Orchard, [1955] 15 West. Weekly R. (as.) 49, 75-77, [1955J 3 D.L.R.
15, 39-41 (Man. C.A.), 34 CAN. B. REV. 70 (1956) (wrongful expulsion a tortious depri-
vation of status) ; Lucio v. Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 139 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1956) (same,
semble). See Summers, supra note 165, at 1050-58; Note, 41 MNw N. L. REv. 212 (1956).
167. Most American courts have avoided identifying who the parties to the member-
ship contract are. See Summers, supra note 165, at 1055. The rationale of Kelly's case,
see notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text, has not been followed in American wrongful
expulsion suits, Annot., 62 A.L.R. 315, 316 (1929). But similar reasoning has been used
to defeat other types of member claims. E.g., Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88
A.2d 851 (1952) ; Hromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
168. See Textile Workers Union v. Textron, Inc., 99 N.H. 385, 111 A.2d 823 (1955).
169. 348 U.S. 437, 457-59, 465-67 (1955). See Mendelsohn 194-201; Stem, Intra-
Union Activities, Membership and Collective Bargaining Rights under Pennylvania Law,
29 TEmP. L.Q. 38,57-64 (1955).
170. Cf. Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955) (union a trustee ad litem for members' claims).
171. See Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 195, 238
(1938) (suggesting need to develop action against union equivalent to stockholder's suit in
corporate law).
There should be analogies in union law to both the direct and derivative stockholder's
suits. Thus, the former might be brought against the union if it refused to institute arbitra-
tion proceedings under the collective bargaining contract to enforce a member's rights.
Doyle v. La Sorda, 135 N.Y.L.J. No. 87, p. 7, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 3, 1956), and
Terrell v. Local 758, International Ass'n of Machinists, 26 Lab. Arb. 579 (Cal. App. April
23, 1956), illustrate the need for this type of suit. The action should also be available to
restrain improper uses of union funds, such as those indicated in the recent congressional
investigations of the Teamsters Union. See, e.g., Time, April 1, 1957, p. 14. The derivative
suit might be brought by a number of members in the union's name, joining union and em-
ployer as defendants, if in a Westinghouse-type situation the union refused to sue the
employer on the bargaining contract.
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Diversity Jurisdiction
Qualification of unions as "citizens" for purposes of federal diversity juris-
diction should be a further important result of the juridical person concept.
The Supreme Court has never passed on the question of union "citizenship."'
1 72
Most lower federal courts, relying on the aggregate theory, have looked for
diversity purposes to the citizenship of the members, as they would with any
unincorporated association. 73 But recently the Sixth Circuit, in American
Federation of Musicians v. Stein, indicated that it might be prepared to con-
sider a union a juridical person and hence a "citizen" were it proved to have
the characteristics of the union described in Coronado.
174
If the Supreme Court agrees that a union is a juridical person, the Court
should likewise be willing to hold it a citizen for diversity purposes. In Puerto
Rico v. Russell & Co.1 75 the Court held that a Puerto Rican limited partner-
ship (sociedad en cornandita), a juridical person but not a corporation, was
a citizen for diversity purposes.176 Citizenship, the Court made clear, is an
attribute of juridical personality, not a consequence of incorporation or a "con-
clusive presumption" of the citizenship of shareholders. 177 Since the leading
172. In Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933), certiorari was denied
on the "citizenship" question although granted on another jurisdictional issue. Certiorari
was also denied in Ex parte Edelstein, 279 U.S. 851 (1929) and in American Federation
of Musicians v. Stein, 348 U.S. 873 (1954). In Barker Painting Co. v. Local 734, Brother-
hood of Painters, 281 U.S. 462 (1930), diversity jurisdiction had been invoked on allegation
that an unincorporated local union was a "citizen" (see Record, pp. 4, 18), but the Supreme
Court opinion did not consider the point.
173. E.g., Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied on this issue, 287 U.S. 590
(1932) ; Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 851 (1929) ; cf.
Russell v. Central Labor Union, 1 F.2d 412 (E.D. Ill. 1924) (same result under entity
theory). But see Ex parte Edelstein, supra at 638-40 (dissenting opinion).
174. 213 F.2d 679, 685-88 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954). Accord, Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers v. A. L. Kornman Co., 30 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 69952 (M.D. Tenn.
May 2, 1956). See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 92 F. Supp. 841
(W.D. Pa. 1950) (requisite diversity between unions in interpleader action). See also Van
Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1947) (joint stock company);
Remington's Dairy v. Rutland Ry. Corp., 15 F.R.D. 488 (D. Vt. 1954) (partnership) ;
Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924) (voluntary
association); cf. Seattle Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (N.D. Cal. 1905).
175. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
176. 3 Moonz 1413-14 approves the decision and recommends its extension to other
unincorporated associations as a desirable change in existing law.
177. 288 U.S. at 479-80. The Court here enumerated five characteristics as establishing
juridical personality. These are also possessed by unions. See the Supreme Court's descrip-
tion of union characteristics in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701-03 (1944), and
the provisions of § 301, See also note 65 szpra; cf. Hemphill v. Orloff 277 U.S. 537, 550
(1928).
A corporation was first deemed a citizen of the state of incorporation for diversity pur-
poses in Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). The rule was
later justified as a "conclusive presumption" that all the shareholders were citizens of the
state of incorporation. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329
(1854). See McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 H~Av. L. REv. 853 (1943).
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case against citizenship for unincorporated associations, Great Southern Hotel
Co. v. Jones, rests on a stated unwillingness to extend the "conclusive presump-
tion" rule to encompass partnership associations,1 78 it seems to have been in
effect overruled by Puerto Rico.179 The Court itself, however, distinguished
Great Southern and other precedents on the ground that suability was but one
characteristic required for juridical personality and the associations involved
in the earlier cases had lacked other necessary characteristics. 8 0  Factually
viewed, this distinction is tenuous and probably derives from the Great
Southern Court's misunderstanding of the nature of the Pennsylvania limited
partnership bringing the suit.181 Actually, the limited partnership in that case
had virtually the same characteristics of juridical personality as the one in Puerto
Rico.182 In the light of Puerto Rico, Great Southern seems to have validity,
if at all, only on a point of pleading: the suit was brought not in the name of
the association but of the partners, all of whom had the necessary diversity of
citizenship but may have failed to allege it sufficiently. 8 3 After amending the
citizenship allegation they eventually won on the merits in the Supreme Court.
8 4
178. 177 U.S. 449,457 (1900).
179. See 33 CoLum. L. Rzv. 540, 541 (1933) ; 47 HARv. L. REv. 135, 136 (1933).
180. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933). Levering & Garrigues Co.
v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932), was among those found distinguishable; but the
opinion shows the Court was under the erroneous impression that Levering involved a
joint stock company, not a union. 388 U.S. at 480.
181. See WARUN 514-16, 519-20.
182. The view that a Pennsylvania limited partnership has all the essential corporate
characteristics had been expressed shortly before Great Southern by a circuit court on which
sat future Chief Justice Taft and future Justice Lurton. Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown
Coke Co., 86 Fed. 585, 586-96 (6th Cir. 1898). Accord, Bushnell v. Park Bros. & Co., 46
Fed. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1891), aff'd, 60 Fed. 583 (2d Cir. 1894). Youngstown, like Puerto
Rico, concluded that these characteristics warranted diversity "citizenship" 86 Fed. at
595-96. This opinion, strikingly similar to Taft's in Coronado, may indicate how he would
have resolved the union citizenship question had it been before him. See notes 64 and 65
supra.
Youngstown, though rejected in Great Southern, contains a much fuller consideration
than the latter of the nature of the Pennsylvania association. In Great Southern the Court
was doubtless hindered by inadequate presentation by counsel. The Court first raised the
citizenship question, not considered below, during the oral argument, and counsel then sub-
mitted memoranda on it. See 177 U.S. at 453. The short "Supplemental Memoranda"
favoring citizenship, reprinted in Petition for Certiorari, pp. 91-93, Puerto Rico v. Russell
& Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), does not cite Youngstown or other federal cases that support
its position. Counsel probably was not much concerned over the citizenship point since the
lack of diversity was curable by amendment. See notes 183-84 infra and accompanying
text.
183. Even on this ground the decision would be questionable. Respondents pointed out
in their Supplemental Memoranda, see note 182 supra, that their allegations implying all
members were Pennsylvania citizens corresponded closely to allegations held sufficient as
to plaintiffs' citizenship in Express Co. v. Kountze Bros., 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 342, 351 (1869).
But the Court in Great Southern misunderstood respondents as relying on Kountze's
allegations of defendant's, not plaintiffs', citizenship, and on that basis rejected respondents'
claim. 177 U.S. at 455.
184. Great Southern Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532 (1904).
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Clearly, such a weak if often cited "leading case" should be given little weight
in resolving the very different problems of union rights and responsibilities
today.
185
In contrast to most uses of diversity jurisdiction today, extended diversity
jurisdiction for unions 16 would clearly implement the purpose underlying the
constitutional provision: avoidance of local prejudice. The Framers sought
to avoid both the possibility of prejudice in state tribunals and out-of-state
suitors' fears on that account. 187 Avoidance of hostile state legislation has also
been suggested as their aim.188 All three reasons seem particularly applicable
to union litigants in southern states, for example. Undoubtedly, unions there
185. Even weaker as a precedent is Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889), still
cited frequently and held "decisive" of the citizenship issue in Great Southern Hotel Co. v.
Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 454 (1900). In Chapman, as the Court itself pointed out, the citizen-
ship question was not argued by either party. 129 U.S. at 681. Nor was the plaintiff joint
stock company even represented by counsel before the Supreme Court. Id. at 678. The
Court cited no authorities and indicated no awareness of lower court precedents holding a
joint stock company a citizen for diversity purposes. E.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Adams
Express Co., 22 Fed. 404 (C.C. Md. 1884) ; Fargo v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 6 Fed. 787
(C.C. Ind. 1881). Perhaps, as the language of Chapman implies, it too was simply a
matter of bad pleading. See 129 U.S. at 682. It was so interpreted in Youngstown, supra
note 182, at 586, and perhaps by other lower courts that did not follow Chapman. See,
e.g., Bushnell v. Park Bros. & Co., 46 Fed. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1891), aff'd, 60 Fed. 583 (2d
Cir. 1894) (ignoring Chapman) ; cf. Johnson v. City of St. Louis, 172 Fed. 31, 40-41 (Sth
Cir. 1909) (distinguishing Chapman). Moreover, had the Chapman Court believed itself
without jurisdiction, according to usual practice it would not have passed on the merits.
See 129 U.S. at 680-8L
Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904), holding citizenship of all members
of the Ohio State University Board of Trustees must be alleged although the Board was
suable in its own name, should be limited to its facts. There the Board was created by a
special legislative act, which if construed to confer corporate powers would have violated
the Ohio Constitution and overruled the state supreme court's interpretation of the Ohio
statute. Moreover Thomas, like Great Southern, involved a relatively small association,
all of whose members were citizens of the same state; they could feasibly be treated on an
individual basis, as members of a large trade union cannot.
186. Unions now can qualify for diversity jurisdiction if, as occasionally happens, all
individual members have the requisite citizenship. See cases cited note 125 supra. They
also have qualified in class suits, where only the named representatives' citizenship is con-
sidered. E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (Sth Cir. 1948) ; Tisa v.
Potofsky, 90 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Local 192, American Federation of Teachers
v. American Federation of Teachers, 44 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ; see International
'Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D.N.J.
1.940). But this circumvention of the usual diversity restrictions will be unavailable if
§ 301 (b) has eliminated representative suits by union officials in federal courts. See note
152 supra.
187. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S* (5 Crancli.) 61, 87 (1809) (pei Mar-
shall, C.J.) ; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) ; Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. Rv. 49, 83 (1923).
188. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAav. L. REv. 483,
495 (1928) ; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928).
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confront hostile state legislation 189 and fear bias by state courts.190 A con-
gressional subcommittee study showing the prevalence in the southeast of
"abuse of injunctions" against unions indicates that such bias is real. 91
Important additional reasons peculiar to the labor field exist for increased
diversity jurisdiction. Labor law is an area in which most cases, even those
concerning enforcement of state-created rights, will involve questions of federal
law. A consistent and uniform solution of these federal issues can best be
achieved by entrusting their treatment whenever possible to federal courts.
In particular, extensive problems of pre-emption, more pronounced than in
any other field, arise. The Supreme Court has emphasized that these pre-
emption problems present complex questions susceptible of resolution only on
a case-by-case basis through a long course of authoritative judicial decision.'92
Yet in fact these difficult questions of federal law arise most often before a
variety of lower state courts, which understandably lack the experience and
qualification in labor law that federal district courts and the NLRB possess. 19
And for the most part initial state court decisions granting temporary injunc-
tions and denying the pre-emption claim finally dispose of the case at hand,
189. See, e.g., Saposs, Rebirth of the American Labor Movement, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIois RESEARCH Ass'N 25 (1956);
De Vyver, The Present Status of Labor Unions in the South-1948, 16 So. EcoN. J. 1,
16-17 (1949); Woll, Biased Against Labor, American Federationist, June 1956, p. 6;
Rhodes, The South Moves Forward, id., May 1949, pp. 20-21; id., Feb. 1956, p. 39. The
Supreme Court has invalidated some of the more extreme southern legislation. E.g., Hill v.
Florida cx rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). "Right-to-work" laws present a serious obstacle
to unionization in southern states. See sources cited supra. These have been held constitu-
tional. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). But
the Supreme Court has rebuffed their underlying philosophy: "One would have to be blind
to history to assert that trade unionism did not enhance and strengthen the right to work."
Railway Employes Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956).
190. See, e.g., Woll, supra note 189; American Federationist, Jan. 1956, p. 44.
191. Labor injunctions, the subcommittee found, have sharply increased in the south-
east during the post-war period. They have been used by employers as economic weapons
to exclude or defeat unions, thus frustrating the national policy of encouraging collective
bargaining. In over 90% of the cases studied the employer-plaintiff was granted some re-
lief; proceedings were usually ex parte, with a hearing often delayed for weeks or months
and seldom any higher court review. State Court Injunctions, Report of the Subcommittee
on Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. Doc.
No. 7, 82d Cong., lst Sess. (mislabeled 81st Cong., 2d Sess.) 6-12, 92-118 (1951). The
report was compiled by independent university investigators.
192. E.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955) ; Garner v. Team-
sters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 771 (1947). See, generally, Hays, Federalism and the
Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutional Crisis in PROCEEDINGS, Op. Cit. mpra note 189, at 56;
Glushein, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 15 FED. B.J. 4 (1955) ; Cox, Federalism
in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297 (1954).
193. See Hays, supra note 192, at 62; Rose, Federal-State Court Conflicts in Labor
Injunction Cases, 15 FED. B.J. 16 (1955) ; Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1026 (1953) ; Annot., 97
L. Ed. 208, 214 n.16 (1952).
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since generally the proceeding is either unreviewable or could not be reviewed
in time to make any practical difference.19 4 Absent diversity, removal to a
federal court can ordinarily be prevented by the employer wording his com-
plaint solely in terms of state law.195 Nor can a federal court enjoin the state
court's proceedings, however clearly the latter's jurisdiction may have been
pre-empted. 196 As a result, the national policy of labor relations is constantly
being undercut by state courts.1 7 Diversity jurisdiction, when exercised
originally or on removal,198 would enable the party so desiring to have cases
194. See sources cited note 193 supra; Sherman, State and Federal Jurisdiction in
Labor Relations in PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 189, at 71, 85; A state court temporary
injunction is unreviewable by the Supreme Court, not being a "final order." Montgomery
Bldg. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 (1952).
195. See Gilbert, Removal and Remtand wider the Taft-Hartley Act, 7 LAB. L.J. 745
(1956) ; Comment, 52 MicH. L. REv. 726 (1954).
196. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955), The
Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 H.lv. L. REv. 120, 180-85; NLRB v. Swift & Co., 233
F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1956), 41 MINN. L. Rv. 228. These decisions depend upon a stringent
interpretation of the Judicial Code's limitations on the power of federal courts to enjoin
state suits. 2&U.S.C. § 2283 (1952).
197. Congress deliberately chose not to allow private parties to obtain injunctive relief
against conduct constituting unfair labor practices; the exclusive remedy was to be through
the NLRB. See Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th
Cir. 1948); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947); 93 CONG. PRac. 4132-33,
4834-47, 4864, 4868, 6446 (1947). Thus if state courts enjoin such conduct (and especially
if they issue ex parte injunctions), the congressional scheme is circumvented. See Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 524-26 (1955) (dissenting
opinions) ; Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J.
415, 484-86 (1956). Likewise the congressional design is frustrated where state courts en-
join activity protected by federal law. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Floor-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
198. Removal of injunction cases presents special problems. First, the employer might
join individual parties of local citizenship as defendants. See note 210 infra. But this
should not be allowed to defeat removal if the union is a juridical person and a decree
against it is sufficient to bind the members, see FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d), just as a corpora-
tion's right to remove cannot be thwarted by joining local stockholders as defendants. Cf.
Wecker v. National Enameling Co., 204 U.S. 176 (1907); Geer v. Mathieson Alkali
Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903); Boatner v. American Express Co., 122 Fed. 714 (C.CW.D.
Ky. 1903); Carothers v. McKinley Mining Co., 122 Fed. 305 (C.C.D. Nev. 1903). In-
dividual defendants would not then be "parties in interest properly joined" as required to
defeat removal by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Or if they were, the case against the union might
be "a separate and independent claim or cause of action" meriting removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (c). Secondly, some federal district courts, when removal was sought on federal
question grounds, have remanded state injunction cases on the ground that otherwise they
would have to dismiss because the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction or because the Norris-
LaGuardia Act deprived them of jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. See sources
cited note 195 supra. But neither reason seems adequate to deny the statutory right of
removal on diversity grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The federal court has jurisdiction in
diversity to determine jurisdictional facts affecting the merits; if it then finds that the ex-
clusive remedy is in the NLRB, its duty is to dismiss rather than remand to a state tri-
bunal also having no jurisdiction. Nor should the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevent the
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that turn on federal labor questions decided in federal courts. 9  In these tri-
bunals, moreover, the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, applicable in di-
versity as in other cases, 20 0 would effectively guard against abuses of the in-
junctive power.
201
Congress in passing sections 301 and 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act deliberately
chose to give federal courts jurisdiction over unions in matters previously
cognizable only in state courts. Extension of diversity jurisdiction to unions
is clearly consistent with this policy.20 2 But because the constitutional and
assumption of jurisdiction: the federal court may still grant the injunction if plaintiff meets
the act's requirements, e.g., Tri-Plex Shoe Co. v. Cantor, 25 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Pa. 1939),
and the court is not restricted to giving injunctive relief but has jurisdiction to award
damages instead. The most difficult problem might be determination of whether the $3000
jurisdictional requirement was met. If removal is unavailable, the union might gain relief
through an appropriate collateral action in federal court. For example, if it anticipates
the employer's intention to seek a state court injunction against its federally-protected
activities, it might enjoin the employer from instituting the suit. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908); Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U.S. 214 (1918). See also Texas
& N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). Since state court pro-
ceedings would not have started, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 would not bar the injunction. See note
196 supra and accompanying text. Or if the union suffered injury from an improperly
granted state injunction, it might sue for damages in federal court. See Bunch v. Launius,
222 Ark. 760, 765, 262 S.W.2d 461, 464 (1953) (dictum).
199. In diversity jurisdiction, the Westinghouse limitations on union standing to en-
force employee claims under the collective bargaining contract would not apply, since that
decision dealt solely with § 301 jurisdiction. See 348 U.S. at 459-61. Rather the union
could claim standing under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). It might qualify as "a party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another"; or "trustee
of an express trust"; or, if its membership contract so provided, an assignee for collection,
which in most states would make it "the real party in interest." See 3 MOORE 1312-72;
AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950) (§ 301 jurisdiction exists in
suit brought by union involving violation of contract rights of one employee).
Should the still-outstanding question of whether § 301 grants jurisdiction to enforce
arbitration agreements be resolved in the negative, diversity jurisdiction might afford a
forum for their enforcement. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), only
held the United States Arbitration Act inapplicable in diversity suits on contracts not
involving interstate commerce. But collective bargaining contracts commonly involve in-
terstate commerce and so, if otherwise within the act's coverage, may be enforceable in
diversity situations. Cf. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004,
1006 (2d Cir. 1933). See, generally, Mendelsotn 172-75, 179-83; Cox, Grievance Arbi-
tration in the Federal Courts, 67 -ARv. L. REv. 591 (1954).
200. Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1934); Tri-Plex Shoe Co. v. Cantor, 25 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Pa.
1939). See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 287, 290 (1957) (dictum).
Cf. Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 304 (1953).
201. See State Court Injunctions, op. cit. supra note 191, at 2-4.
202. STmENS, CoRPoRATIONS § 11 (2d ed. 1949) points out that a policy of restricting
federal jurisdiction has been behind denial of citizenship status to unincorporated associa-
tions. Therefore, Congress' decision to increase federal jurisdiction over unions should
make the restrictive policy inapplicable to them. Cf. Frankfurter, The Distributionr of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 506, 514
(1928) (specific policy considerations should govern extent of federal jurisdiction).
19571
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statutory meaning of "citizens" 2 3 is ultimately a question for the courts, 20 4
the step must be taken by them, as it was with corporations.20 5 Any restriction
on the effects of such judicial interpretation should be left to Congress.20 6 In
the face of sections 301 and 303, it seems unlikely that Congress would choose
to impose one.
20 7
The availability of diversity jurisdiction should depend on the "citizenship"
of the national or international union, not that of a local which may be involved
in litigation. The constitution and conduct of the national union determine
whether it will be held responsible and vicariously liable for the acts of the
local in a given situation.20 8 But in any case it would be anomalous to give
the local a different "citizenship," since the members of the local are also
members of the national.20 9 To regard the local as having a different citizen-
ship would often result in precluding diversity jurisdiction or removal,210
203. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
204. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949);
Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 445 (1804).
205. See note 177 supra; HART & WEcHs IER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SvsT2. 914-16 (1953). In the case of unions, unlike corporations, no overruling of earlier
Supreme Court holdings is required. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
206. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 344 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (it is up to Congress not Court whether to restrict diversity jurisdiction).
207. An argument that § 301 would overburden the federal judiciary with a mass of
petty litigation was made by opponents of that section. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 13-14 (1947) ; H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1947) ; cf. Asso-
ciation of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 460 (1955). But
Congress rejected the contention, and the minority's apprehensions have proved to be
groundless since the number of § 301 suits litigated has averaged only about ten a year.
See Mendelsohn 197 n.123; note 116 supra. The "burden" argument should be even less
applicable to diversity jurisdiction for unions, since unlike § 301 suits diversity suits are
not exempt from the usual $3000 jurisdictional requirement.
208. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 393-96
(1922); United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 824 (1954); Isbrandtsen Co. v. National Marine Engineers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Gilbert, The International Union-A New Legal Entity, 7 LAB. L.J.
335 (1956). Cf. STEVENS, COIORATIONS § 17 (2d ed. 1949) (parent corporation sometimes
held responsible for acts of subsidiary).
209. Moreover, the national ordinarily is responsible for organizing the local and for
apiproving and partially financing those activities, such as strikes, which give rise to liti-
gation. The local thus differs from a financially independent subsidiary corporation. See
Brinker, Functions of National Unions as Contrasted with Their Locals, 16 So. EcoN. J.
23 (1949) ; Rose, Relationship of the Local Uniom to the International Organization, 38
VA. L. Rwv. 843 (1.952), 4 LAB. L.J. 334 (1953); International Union of Operating
Engineers v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 240 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Ky. 1951).
210. Were the local deemed a citizen of the state in which it operated, there would be
no diversity when an employer was from the same state, and no right of removal when a
plaintiff employer was out-of-state. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(b) (1952). A union local,
however, does not owe its right to exist to state law, but to § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. Accordingly, the status of an out-of-state national union's local affiliate
should be analogous for jurisdictional purposes to that of an out-of-state corporation re-
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thus defeating the policy considerations for extending federal jurisdiction over
unions.211 Since their juridical personality derives from federal legislation
which requires identification of the principal place of business for registration
and other purposes,212 unions should, like national banking associations,
2 13
be deemed citizens for diversity purposes of the state in which their principal
place of business is located.
2 14
CONCLUSION
The concept of juridical personality is a legal tool employed in determining
the relationship of a group to its own members and to third parties. Whether
to assign the group various collective rights and responsibilities is initially
a legislative question. But the conclusion that the legislature has conferred a
status of juridical personality on a group may be inferred by the courts from
quired to incorporate locally: the out-of-state citizenship applies in determining diversity.
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541, 546 (1912) ; Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U.S.
326 (1903). See H~Ar & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 205, at 914; Note, 44 HA v. L.
REv. 1106 (1931).
211. Should the policy considerations cease to be applicable as conditions change,
Congress could contract the diversity jurisdiction, e.g., making it unavailable to local
union plaintiffs.
212. Taft-Hartley Act, §§ 9(f) (1), 11(4), 301(c).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (1952).
214. Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 U.S. 295, 309-10 (1916), holding a
federal railway corporation not to be a citizen of any state for diversity purposes, involved
a statute containing no implication relevant to citizenship of the corporation it created, and
applied a deliberate congressional policy of restricting federal jurisdiction over railway
corporations. But with unions, congressional policy is just the opposite. See note 202 supra
and accompanying text. Therefore, although the legislative provision is less specific than
28 U.S.C. § 1348, governing citizenship of national banks, union citizenship should follow
the rule for national banks rather than that of Bankers Trust, supra. Whether the result-
ing "diversity" jurisdiction has its constitutional basis in the diversity or in the federal
question grant of Article III, § 2, or possibly in Article I powers, may be debatable. See
Continental Nat'l Bank v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119 (1903) ; Ex parte Jones, 164 U.S. 691
(1897); Petri v. Commercial Natl Bank, 142 U.S. 644, 650 (1892); McGovney, A Su-
prenie Court Fiction 1I, 56 H.Av. L. REv. 1090, 1119-24 (1943). Cf. National Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). But the result is the same under any
theory.
Those favoring treatment of unions as citizens for diversity purposes have suggested or
assumed the state of citizenship would be that of the principal place of business. American
Federation of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 685 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873
(1954) ; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. A. L. Kornman Co., 30 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 69952
(M.D. Tenn. May 2, 1956) ; Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636, 639-40 (2d Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 851 (1929) ; 3 MooRE 141.5-16. This suggestion seems more
logical than the rule for corporations, whose citizenship and principal place of business
often are in different states. A similar question arises in regard to unions registered under
the British Trade Union Act. For jurisdictional purposes they are deemed citizens of the
country (England, Scotland or Northern Ireland) where their principal office is located.
CxmrNE, TRADE UNiON LAW 178-79, 246-47 (1950); Mackendrick v. National Union of
Dock Labourers, [1911] Sess. Cas. 83, 89 (Ct. Sess. Scotland).
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a pattern of legislative regulation. In Bonsor this reasoning was applied to
determine that British trade unions are juridical persons.
In the United States, a far more extensive pattern of regulation creates cor-
respondingly stronger reasons for holding unions juridical persons. The view
that unions are mere aggregates of individuals is no longer consistent with the
power they possess and the functions they exercise. Treating them as juridical
persons would remove needless procedural difficulties and curtailment of
substantive rights, and make diversity jurisdiction available to implement na-
tional labor policies.
